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Summary 
This thesis deal with the use and establishing of target budget as a remuneration scheme, and 
also a new remuneration schemes are launched based on spot prices of input factors. The 
report begins with a description of the two problems and the background for this thesis, 
followed by chapters with methodology and facts. The method chapter describes the 
methodology and structure in the process of this thesis and used method of research. The facts 
are about Aker Solution and the subsidiary companies and the Norwegian offshore standard 
contracts. Next the chapter with relevant theory is presented to give a basis for the discussion 
and conclusion. The cases with there target budget models are examined, on basis of the 
contract, interviews, presentations and reports. The spot prices as a remuneration scheme are 
presented, linked to both related to price on raw materials and oil. The summing up of these 
cases is the basis for discussion and conclusion. 
 
The Target budget model is the preferred remuneration scheme in Aker Solutions presented 
maintenance and modification projects, probably because it gives Aker Solutions as a supplier 
the incentives to reduce the cost of the project. The model also contributes to the two parties 
having the same objectives in the execution of the work. The supplier’s incentive in this 
remuneration scheme is to save money for the owner, and by this his profit increases. 
Similarly the suppliers profit is reduced in the event of increased costs for the owner. In both 
this scenarios there are set a cap for the suppliers profit or loss as a result of the project. The 
thesis describes many of the factors that influence on setting this cap, both from a supplier 
and owner situation. The terms of the cap and profit distribution are often set in negotiation 
process, and reflect the division of power. The client’s former contracts and the consensus in 
the work collaboration among the parties influence much on how successful the use if the 
target budget model is, and especially regarding variations in the project.  
 
The constant fluctuations in the market have lead to an alternative approach with a new 
remuneration scheme related to spot prices on input factors. This remuneration scheme gives 
the parties in the contract a more fear sharing of the changes costs that are beyond there 
control. A quality assurance of the model related to the Norwegian surtax system is described, 
and some practical examples are shown. The spot price remuneration scheme has to be linked 
to a credible index that is highly relevant to the costs of the project. 
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Specification of words  
 
Incentives are mechanisms that are used in contracts to make the supplier allocate his 
resources and method of operation to contribute to improve the result of the project. A good 
result demands that the parties have a joint vision on the effect of the incentive scheme. These 
should be easy to evaluate and manage. 
 
Methodology is the teaching in social science research methods. 
 
Owner is one who pays money for materials, products, or services to others. In incentive 
theory often referred to as the principal.  
 
Operating system is the basic management system to operate a business, often consists of 
guidelines and procedures. 
 
Procurement is acquisition of goods and/or services at the best possible quality, at right 
quantity and time, in the right place and from the right source. Simple procurement may 
involve nothing more then repeat purchasing, and a complex procurement could involve 
finding some long term partners. 
 
Subcontractor is one who takes a portion of a contract from the principal contractor or from 
another subcontractor. An individual or company hired by a general or prime contractor to 
perform a specific task as part of the overall project. 
 
Supplier is one who supplies materials, products, or services to others. Other words for the 
supplier can be contractor. In incentive theory often referred to as the agent. 
 
Spot price is the selling price in the market at a particular time. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter the background for the thesis is described, as it is the closure of my five years 
University degree. The delimitation both within practical approach and the academic content 
is presented followed by the structure in this thesis. 
 
1.1 Background for the thesis 
When the problem to address should be selected for the thesis I wanted to write within the oil 
and gas industry. In Norway this is the largest industry, and Stavanger where the University is 
located is the national center for this industry. A large number of companies in the industry, 
both oil- and supply companies are located here and many people in the region have there 
daily work both onshore and offshore. Since the thesis also is the last obstacle before I am 
done with my Master degree I also wanted to look at the opportunity for further engagement 
in the oil and gas industry. 
 
Trough my studies in both contract accomplishment and strategy and related courses, I have 
been fascinated with the strategy and incentives that are made in business. The target budget 
model touch upon this things and are widen used in the industry but not been much research 
on. I contacted Aker Solution, and together with them I built up a sketch for the problem to be 
addressed. After some guidance from professor Osmundsen, the instructor at the University, I 
got a good problem to address. I wanted to look in to the target budget model, get better 
knowledge and in the same time lock at it with a critical view. How the contract is designed, 
and what incentives that are included have a strong influence on the economic outcome of the 
project for both parties in the contract. 
 
Modern contracting theory and the oil companies prefer designing contracts with incentives 
for the supplier to save money when executing the project. The target budget model gives 
these types of incentives. Aker Solutions as a supplier company within the industry execute 
several of there projects remunerated on basis of the target budget model, with various results. 
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I wanted to look in to the whole process of establishing the model, practical experience, take 
some experience and try to draw some concluding remarks.  
The activities in the oil industry is highly affected by the price of oil, and in the last year the 
oil price was at a all time high, before the price fell rapid to the lowest price in a 5 year 
period. It was not only the oil price that was at an extreme high level, but also the price of raw 
materials and services in general in the industry. This volatility prices on raw materials have 
lead to the work towards a remuneration scheme that take in consideration the raise or fall of 
prices on input factors in the project. 
 
1.2 Approach to the problem and delimitation of the thesis 
With this thesis I want to focus on the following: 
 
Objective in problem 1, the target budget phase 
Get better knowledge of the target budget model in contracts. Look at the use of target budget 
as a remuneration scheme in projects. Get the practical approach with a critical view, examine 
conditions for establishing the cap, look in to strong sides and weaknesses, to if possible come 
up with suggestion for improvement and commercial awakening.  
 
Objective in problem 2, the spot-price phase  
Introduce a new remuneration scheme based on spot-price regulations. Verify the model for 
practical use. Relate it to the fluctuating marked of raw materials, and find reliable markets 
and sources to integrate in the use of spot-price regulation. 
 
From this the following title of the thesis is presented: 
“An analysis of the Target budget model and related processes in Aker Solutions offshore 
projects, and an alternative approach with a new remuneration scheme related to spot prices 
on input factors.”  
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Delimitation of the thesis 
Aker Solution is involved in lot of contracts, and I narrowed the thesis down to two contracts. 
Still one M&M contract can consist of over 200 projects or orders. I looked at the two cases 
and the use of the target budget model. The examination of the contract was narrowed down 
to the target budget part since the contracts is large comprehensive documents. In the practical 
use I also focused on the remuneration model, but need some basic knowledge to the project 
in addition to the remuneration schemes. I wanted to avoid this being an accountant thesis, so 
I looked at the overall use, and not so deep in to the financial results and outcome of the 
projects. 
 
In the spot price remuneration scheme I have come up with a new idea for a remuneration 
scheme. I tried to verify the use and come with some practical approach and examples. The 
remuneration scheme need to be customised to the project it shall work in. In that way I have 
only come up whit the practical approach and some guidance, and tried to verify the model 
for use in Norway with the Norwegian taxation system. 
 
The thesis delimitation is also based upon requirements and regulation from the University 
connected to Master’s thesis within 30 ECTS and corresponds to a full semester of work at a 
Master degree level. The thesis has to be handed in at the latest 15th of June 2009.  
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
I have chosen to structure the thesis in three parts 
 
Part I Introduction to the problem 
This part consists of chapter 1 to 4. The problems that are studied further in the thesis are 
presented. First is a short description to the background for the thesis, relevant information 
about the company and used method, followed by the Norwegian standard contract and at the 
end a chapter deal with the theory that is relevant to the thesis.  
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Part II Case study 
This part consists of chapter 5. Here are the analysis of the case from ongoing projects, and 
description of results from the analyses.  
 
Part III Discussion and conclusion 
This part consist of chapter 6 and 7. Here are results of the analyses discussed, and this part is 
finished up with a conclusion of the things that have come to light during the study. 
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2. Method, the selection and use 
In this chapter a short introduction to the general use of method and the characterization of 
some relevant methodology are presented. The method shall secure that the information in the 
thesis is relevant, valid, and are correct and systematic treated and stored. In the end of this 
chapter it is presented and described the thesis method for overtake and store literature and 
information. 
 
2.1 Method – an introduction 
Methodology is not a goal in it self in this thesis, but an instrument to achieve goals of 
research-based character. According to Holme and Solvang (2003) methodology gives us a 
foundation for systematic and methodical work with what, why and who that are connected to 
the problem in the thesis. The understanding of method is a criterion to be able to accomplish 
serious research work. 
 
2.2 What is then a method? 
A method is a technique to come up with a new acknowledgement or validate an already 
known acknowledgement. There is no best practise when it comes to selection and use of 
method. It is fundamental that every method have to be adjusted to the specific problem. The 
method shall secure that the information in the thesis is relevant, valid, and are correct and 
systematic treated and stored. The selection and use of method will be an important element 
to assure quality in the thesis.  
 
2.3 Methodical approach  
Principally we have two methodical approaches in social science; quantitative method and 
qualitative method. It do not exist an absolute partition between these approaches and can 
more be described as opposite parties on the same scale. The approaches are not in 
competition with each others and according to Creswell (2009) they can on the other hand be 
complementary to each other with there strong and weak sides, and to be used in a mixed 
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method. The selection of methodical approach is more a question about overtaking of the 
right type of information. Therefore are the methodical approach not a principle, but a 
strategic choice based on the problem, recourses and potential experience with research. 
 
Still it exist a significant difference between the two methodical approaches. The quantitative 
method converts data in to figures and quantities, and from this statistic analyses are carried 
out. While in qualitative method it is the researchers understanding and interpretation of the 
data that is the basis, in such a way that it do not need to be quantified. A third methodical 
approach is literature study that consists of identifying and examine literature within central 
subjects related to the problem and the selection of sources and reference material. 
 
Table 2.A: Some concept within quantitative and qualitative research (Ryen, A. 2002) 
  Quantitative research   Qualitative research 
Deductive Inductive 
Test of hypothesis Develop of hypothesis 
Nomothetic Ideographic 
Cumulative Incompatible paradigm 
 
2.4 Requirements to the information and data 
2.4.1 Reliability and validity 
The information that is collected has to be reliable and relevant for the subject. It is important 
to look at the reliability and validity of the information that are presented. If a sampling that 
are unreliable or invalid is used it is most likely to have errors in the total result. 
 
2.4.1.1 Validity  
Validity is related to whether used methods, approaches and techniques can really relate to, or 
measure the examined problem. Validity depends on what that are measured and the accuracy 
in the results. The problems with validity arise if what is measured not are in direct 
 Master’s thesis  Fredrik Horne 
Industrial Economics   Spring 2009 
16 : 104
connection with the problem. The validation problem often arises because the researcher has 
to work in two levels; the theoretical level and the empirical level. One work at a theoretical 
level when problem are approached, does demarcation and defines concepts. The 
measurement process on the other hand is at an empirical level. The concepts that are used in 
both levels have to be in correspondence with each other. To achieve a successful piece of 
work it is important to link together theory and practical experience. According to Grenness 
(2001) the validity to a search are related to: 
 The measuring instruments ability to measure exact what is the attention to measure 
 Information collected from the measurements 
 The result from the search 
 The interpretation of the results 
 
2.4.1.2 Reliability 
The question if the information fulfils the demand for validity can not be discussed without 
including reliability. High reliability is a condition for validity. In this is how the 
measurements are done. The reliability can be related to consistent results. A measurement is 
regarded as reliable if it gives us the same result several times, and obtained object are not 
changed in the meantime. The most important factor to secure high reliability is the 
knowledge in use of methods, and it can be useful to do a pre-test of the measuring.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the relationship between reliability and validity  
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In figure 2.1 the relationship between reliability and validity are tried explained.  
 In the first disk the target are hit consistently, but the center of the target are missed. 
There are consistently and systematically measured wrong values for all respondents. 
This measurement reliable, but not valid. 
 In the second disk shows hit that is randomly spread across the target. The center is 
rarely hit, but on average the right answer for the group is obtained. In this case it is a 
valid group estimate, but inconsistent. It is easy to see that reliability is direct related 
to the variability of the measure. 
 The third disk shows a case where the hits are spread across the target but the center is 
consistently missed. The measure in this case is neither reliable nor valid.  
 The fourth disk are consistently hit the center of the target. The measure is both 
reliable and valid. 
 
2.5 Sources of error 
According to Grenness (2001) there are two main types for sources of error; error in the 
measuring and error in the samples. Error in the measuring are related to the handling of large 
amounts of data, or when data is collected from a large number of sources, which primarily 
affects the reliability. Since normally just an abstract of relevant sources is examined, it is 
normal to have so-called sampling errors and these are inevitable. 
 
2.6 Requirement for the use of methods 
When empirical questions are addressed they relate to reality. The word empirical means 
knowledge based on experience. Within science it is certain standards to follow when you 
seek answers: 
 The results have to be in correspondence with reality. 
o After the problem is identified, it is important to prepare a control over the 
examination. When examinations are done we want the results to show the 
actual conditions. There is not a goal to prove that the initiated assertion is 
correct. 
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 The information need to be systematic collected 
o Systematic samples are obtained by examining representative samples within 
the holders of the relevant information. To do sampling within the interest of 
the problem area are strategic sampling. The selected information has to 
support the questions you want answers to. There must be given an explanation 
for how the sampling was selected to indicate that it not was taken to present a 
certain result. 
 The results must be verifiable 
o The results have to be presented in a way that allow a critical view, control and 
testing. 
 Value-neutrality and objectivity 
o It is difficult, and sometimes not possible, for a scientist to do a neutral 
evaluation. It is important that the personal, political or professional level don’t 
influence the research work to much. Objectivity is important to prevent 
personal influence on the results. 
 
2.7 Selection of method in this thesis 
The defined problems in this thesis consist of two problems of unlike structure. I have thereby 
chosen methods that are best suitable for the uniqueness of the problems.  
 
Target budget phase 
Get better knowledge of the target budget model in contracts. Look at the use of target budget 
as a remuneration scheme in projects; get the practical approach with a critical view, examine 
conditions for establishing the cap, look in to strong sides and weaknesses, to if possible come 
up with suggestion for improvement and commercial awakening.   
 
Spot-price phase  
Introduce a new remuneration scheme based on spot price regulations. Verify the model for 
practical use. Relate it to the fluctuating marked of raw materials, and find reliable markets 
and sources to integrate in the use of spot price regulation. 
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Since the nature of the two phases is unequal, the methods will be so as well. In the target 
budget phase I have used a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative approach, and in the 
main quantitative method. I have used two individual contracts and examined the use of target 
budget, but also done qualitative interviews with persons related to the projects. In the spot 
price phase I have used a combination of quantitative and qualitative method, and in the main 
qualitative method. This phase involves an innovative approach, and method of research that 
can be described as developing of hypothesis. 
 
In general the method selection consists of determine the approach to reply to the problem 
and demands an evaluation of the most suited method. It can be stated that the selected 
method provides the qualified assumptions for the thesis, when a completed examination can 
not be changed or improved without significant extra work.  
 
The method will also include a literature study to bring out the literature that is most relevant 
for the problem and select what are to be sources and references in the thesis. It will mainly 
be focused on known literal work and authors, but an innovative thinking from not that well 
known author will give the thesis originality. 
 
2.7.1 The methodical use in this thesis 
The use of method has for its object to set the selected method out in practical use, as in this 
thesis involve go through with literature study, prepare interviews, go through with 
interviews, analyse and present discoveries and results. The use of method shall secure that 
the collected information in this thesis is being systematic treat and stored to assure the 
quality of the data and ensure the verification principle. 
 
The interviews in the target budget phase have been of an unstructured character, and 
consisted most of questionnaires and discussion with people that have been part of the tender 
process and the people managing the awarded contracts. This has been a very useful method 
in order to collect data that most likely is not possible to get from other techniques like 
observations and questionnaires. The unstructured interview can be described more or less as 
an open conversation. The strength with this type of interviews is that the person that is 
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interviewed can express him self freely without being forced in to a specific mindset. The 
verification in this phase is references and link to the project and contract.  
 
The developing of hypothesis in the spot price phase has involved from problems in times 
when prices varies a lot. The hypothesis has an innovative approach and taken in consider 
known practise and literature within the procurement field, the Norwegian tax system and 
business practice within the Aker system. The verification here is the correspondence with the 
Norwegian oil taxation office. 
 
The use of relevant literature has been an important remedy to carry out the thesis. The 
amount of theory within the problem areas is limited, but I have researched relevant articles 
addition to procedures and internal documents, reports and presentations within the Aker 
system. The carried out literal study have been done in both AOP’s internal library, the 
project reports and at the University library at UiS. This has resulted in core literature for the 
thesis, which is presented in the list of references. 
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Aker ownership shown (in %) 
1 Held by Aker Holding 
2 Including shares owned by Aker Solutions 
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3. Presentation of facts  
In this chapter Aker Solution, the company this thesis is written in, are introduced. It is also 
presents the operating businesses within Aker Solutions and Aker Offshore Partner as a 
subsidiary, followed by a brief presentation of the Norwegian standard contracts that are 
widely used at the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Figure 3.1: Aker and subsidiary companies  
3.1 Aker Solutions 
Aker Solutions is a leading provider of engineering and construction, technology products, 
execution, service and integrated solutions for the oil and gas and process industry. In the 
company it is approximately 23 000 employees and 10 000 agency workers in around 30 
countries, and hade an operating revenue of 52 billion NOK in 2008. 
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The history of the company goes back to Oslo in 1842 with the founding of “Aker Mekaniske 
Verksted” and in 1853 the founding of “Kvaerner Brug” 
 
The two companies have hade many business areas in the years, but have hade a strong focus 
on the oil and gas industry since the Norwegian oil adventure in the early 1970’s. The 
companies merged in 2002 and founded Aker Kvaerner, who in 2008 announced its new 
name Aker Solutions. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Aker Solutions operating business 
3.2 Aker Offshore Partner 
Aker Offshore Partner AS (AOP) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Aker Solution, and 
operates under Energy Development and Services inn the segment MMO North Sea. AOP is a 
turnkey contractor for the oil and gas industry. The company is engaged in front end studies, 
field development with new platforms, modifications to existing platforms, maintenance, 
operations and field decommissioning and removal. AOP covers all engineering disciplines, 
procurement, material administration and project management. The company has some 2 500 
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employees including region offices in Bergen, Kristiansund and Stjørdal, and the head office 
who is located in Stavanger, Norway. 
 
Off the 2 500 employees is approximately half of the staff operators in both the 
manufacturing workshop and offshore, the rest of the staff is administrative employees, like 
engineers, project support and management and finance.  
 
3.3 Aker Offshore Partners different contracts  
AOP is in present time involved in different types of contracts. In new build is the Kashagan 
project in the Caspian Sea, major modifications is Statfjord late life, Oseberg drilling upgrade 
and Valhall Re-development. In Maintenance and modification is the Tampen contract with 
StatoilHydro, BP M&M, Esso BSSA, Shell NISC and in decommissioning Frigg cessation 
project. In addition to this AOP have a large study division who does do pre-studies (pre-
engineering) for oil companies. The pre-studies will determine on an early phase if the 
concept is worth developing or not, and the expected costs of development and execution. All 
these different contracts have various remuneration schemes, all from lump sum, to rates, to 
completely reimbursable remuneration.  
 
The different contracts also involves a various phases, all from just engineering phase (E), to 
large general contracts (EPCI), where all parts of the organisation is involved in the project. 
 
3.4 The Norwegian offshore standard contracts NF 05, NTK 05 and 
NTK 05 MOD 
3.4.1 The standard contracts in general  
Statoil, Hydro, Saga and the National Association of Technology Companies, now Federation 
of Norwegian Industries, have negotiated standard contracts to be used on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Principally we have the Norwegian Fabrication contract, NF 05, and 
Norwegian Total Contract, NTK 05. The latest bloomer to the standard contracts is 
Norwegian Total Contract Modification, NTK 05 MOD. The first type of these contracts was 
NF 92, and this have evolved and developed to the contracts mentioned above.  
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The gains of standardisation are saved time and cost for the parties with establishing common 
practice and rules that both parties know well. The standardisation make the transaction cost 
lower and save time you don’t have in a tender process. 
 
Most contracts need a certain degree of individual contents. Every contract need to take in 
consideration the circumstances on every single scope, what type, size, the parties’ interaction 
and so on. The contractual attachments ought to be individual, but it is often most suitable to 
have the general contractual conditions standardised.  
 
The elementary rules about dividing of risk are too important and difficult to be discussed in 
every single contract negotiation. These rules have to be set on a methodical basis. The 
question about risk is in the end depending upon every single contract. The effect of the 
elementary rules in the contractual terms is depending on the contracts requirement to 
execution, price, time schedule etc. 
 
All the Norwegian standard contracts focus on progress by the plan and related milestones. 
The administration of variation, errors, warranty and incurrence is clearly defined and so is 
the reasonability. The delivery and payment are regulated, and systems, routines and 
procedures for organisational and administrative work are defined. The contracts also regulate 
work on running installations and HSE matters. 
 
3.4.2 NF 05 
For fabrication of larger devices to the oil and gas industry on the Norwegian continental 
shelf NF 05 is used. Norwegian Fabrication contract applies for StatoilHydro and Norwegian 
Industry association. In all contracts with large devices that are agreed between StatoilHydro 
and a member company of the Federation of Norwegian Industries, like AOP, shall NF 05 be 
applicable. Other companies also use NF, but then often with small adjustments.  
 
The cause for composing the standard contract was to simplify the contractual process for 
both parties. The standardisation also involve the possibility develop technical and good 
commercial balanced contractual terms. 
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NF 05 is an extensive document with 37 articles. The structure has common features from the 
Anglo-American contractual administration, witch is; detailed provisions and definitions, 
wide focus on contractual administration and frequent use of cross references. Since it is a 
Norwegian standard contract the terminology and the systematic processes show signs of 
Norwegian contract law. 
 
3.4.3 NTK 05 
This standard contract is applicable for all larger project tasks with engineering, procurement, 
fabrication and installation, EPCI contracts. NTK was also initiated by the same organisations 
like NF, and was developed since the use of NF was not adequate for use in larger 
development projects. NTK 05 is an extensive document with 38 articles on 44 pages.  
 
3.4.4 NTK 05 MOD 
This standard contract is applicable for all larger project tasks within modification of oil and 
gas installations on the Norwegian continental shelf. The contract in it self is very similar to 
the NTK, but especially regulates the offshore activities in contract. NTK 05 MOD is an 
extensive document with 38 articles on 51 pages.  
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4. Brief presentation of relevant theory 
This chapter presents general theory within contracting, the contract models, incentives and 
the most used remuneration schemes. Variations in contract are explained followed by the 
introduction to the new remuneration scheme based on spot prices and indexation in general.  
 
4.1 Contract strategy 
The strategy of a project shall describe how the project overall is executed to reach the goals 
and targets in a best possible way. The unified project strategy can consist of several sub-
strategies whit a certain relevance to each other. The most common strategies are; carrying 
out strategy, contract strategy, communication strategy and directing strategy. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Summing up relevant elements to establish a contract strategy. 
Responsibility usually at the owner Responsibility usually at the 
supplier  
Small  Large 
Prefer responsibility at the owner Prefer responsibility at the 
supplier 
Adapted for responsibility at 
the owner 
Adapted for responsibility at 
the supplier 
Can transfer responsibility Have the responsibility in any case Legal 
framework 
Standards 
and routines 
The markeds 
preferences  
Frequency of 
projects 
Spectra of 
contractual 
strategies 
Overall contract strategy 
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The contract strategy will describe how to secure appropriate competition in the selection 
phase, how to divide assignments, reasonability and uncertainty, and what kind of contractual 
instruments that is established to support the control and management in the execution phase. 
The theory often refers to two types of contract strategy, general and specific strategy. The 
general contract strategy is for the business in general, while the specific is for the single 
project. 
 
The strategy that is brief presented in this chapter is linked to the owner and the supplier, as 
two parties in a contractual relationship. Owner is the one that have taken the initiative for the 
process and wants to pay the supplier to do work. The supplier is undertaken the owner and 
wants to do a certain type of work or provide services for money. The specific contract 
strategy will depend on a broad spectre of elements like the relationship between this two 
parties and there abilities and competence. Depending on these things, the contract strategy is 
established and carried out. 
 
The contract theories recommend customising the strategy to the single project. It is not 
possible to objectively define what the correct solution at all time is, but it is possible to give 
guidance to what strategy that can be uses under given circumstances. Strong cost controls are 
important in straitened circumstances, and contractual flexibility is important when final 
outcome is unknown or the technical challenges are great. 
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Figure 4.2: Circumstances in a specific contract strategy 
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4.2 Incentive theory in contracts 
Incentive is mechanisms that can be used in contracts, and have the intention to make the 
supplier allocate his recourses and method of operation to improve the result of the project. A 
good result demands that the parties have a shared view on the impacts of the incentive 
scheme. The incentive schemes have to be easy to evaluate and manage. 
 
General incentive regulates the interaction between the two parties in the contract, the owner 
and the supplier. In contractual relation we can relates to two extreme points, the conventional 
contracts with a large distance between the two parties, and the other extreme point, an 
alliance where the parties have a close collaboration. In the middle of the two points of view 
is the rational contract. The parties have frequent collaboration, but stick to the distribution of 
responsibility that is drawn in the contract. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Economic incentives (Hetland and Fevang, 1997)  
In the selection of incentive scheme to bee used, it’s important to keep in mind the owners 
objective, the parties ability to bear risk and the remuneration scheme. One of the extreme 
points the incentive scheme is linked to minimize the costs in every single contract, and in the 
other point the incentives is linked to maximizing the projects lifecycle value.
Implicit 
cultural 
norms 
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4th order 
3rd order 
2nd order 
1st order 
Conventional Alliance Rational 
Maximize the projects lifecycle value 
Minimize the projects lifecycle cost
Minimize the costs in 
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Minimize the projects 
investments 
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The incentive intensity in the contract depends on the owners request to influence the 
suppliers work and the importance of the result of the work, often with a specific goal or 
milestone. 
 
In a contract the incentive intensity is to be frequent when: 
 The supplier has a low risk aversion. If the supplier has a low risk aversion he will 
accept an incentive based compensation without demanding a high risk premium. 
 The additional effort from the supplier is very profitable for the owner. 
 The owner can measure the supplier’s performance with high precision. If the 
performance is hard to measure, the supplier face a risk related to the measuring, and 
will demand a risk premium. Possible measuring errors, in the supplier case, can result 
in additional conflicts. 
 The supplier’s performance responds strongly to the economic incentives. 
 
Optimal use of incentive systems in contracts can align the interests of the parties; make the 
supplier keep the cost low, and the quality high. If the project evolves different then the 
incentive system assumes, the incentive can accelerate the costs in the project.  
 
Common sense will tell that suppliers with limited profit and financial strength would be risk 
avers, but these often take a bigger share of the risk then what is logical. This happen both in 
straitened times when supplier fight for work, but also in times when suppliers are “drowned” 
in work. 
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4.3 Turn key contracts (EPCI/EPC) 
This type of contract gives the responsibility for the execution of the project to one supplier. 
The model is carried out through the owner’s defined functional requirement and the supplier 
uses his knowledge in the selection of concept. The supplier has the general responsibility for 
engineering, procurement, construction and installation.  
 
The Norsok process was initiated in 1993 to reduce the cost and execution time at the 
Norwegian continental shelf. The process concluded in the benefits of involving the supplier 
in the early phase of the project, and for the owner to have functional requirements rather then 
complete design. In this way the supplier can come up with a more optimal design, based on 
the functional requirements. 
 
This type of contract demand good functional requirements and the owner can not interfere in 
the supplier’s execution of the project. 
 
The use of EPCI/EPC contracts is suitable when: 
 The functional requirements are well defined 
 The technical concept is developed by the supplier 
 The majority of the work is done by the supplier  
 The market have the capacity, competence and financial strength 
 It is possible with competitors in substantial part of the work 
 The international marked are attract to the project 
 
The effect of the contract model: 
 Uniform responsibility for progress, quality and warranties 
 Lower execution time and investment costs 
 Few contractual interfaces 
 Incentives for general cooperation 
 Risk related to higher operating cost 
 The detailed of design is just for production 
 The design is suited for the suppliers building methods 
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4.4 Multiple primes contracts (E+P+C+I) 
This contracting model is carried out with strong involvement from the owner and he have 
influence in and trough all phases. It is a large flexibility in the design and execution, but 
requires high degree of definition for each phase. The owner need knowledge to coordinate 
the project, control the interfaces and thereby take the risk related to these things. 
 
The use of separate contracts is suitable when: 
 Need of flexibility 
 Limited competition in the marked, in regard of capacity, competence and financial 
strength 
 Limited competition in regard of important part of the work 
 High risk related to project execution 
 
The effect of the contract model: 
 Diversification of reasonability, quality and warranties 
 Longer execution time and larger investment costs 
 Large number of contractual interfaces 
 Lack of incentives for cooperation between the suppliers 
 Possibility to make the operating costs lower  
 The design have to be generalised to fit for a large number of suppliers 
 The design have to be take in consider a variety of construction methods 
 
4.5 Frame agreement 
A frame agreement is a contract agreement between two parts regarding the delivery of 
products or services. The agreement is a one-sided commitment for the supplier to deliver 
within the frames that are agreed in the contract. The delivery within the frame agreement is 
done after a call-off from the owner. The call-off gives the parties a mutual commitment. A 
call-off is the order that is made according to the frame agreement. 
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The intention in use of frame agreements is to get an increased raise of value in the matters of 
lower administration costs, a shorter execution time for the project, better technical solutions 
through the involvement of suppliers in an early phase and a standardisation of products. 
 
The products or services that are delivered in the frame agreement could be in a turn key 
(EPCI) or separated (E/P/C/I) model. The frame agreement and the condition related to it is 
often described in a extensive contractual document who describe how the parties shall relates 
to each other, the responsibility of each parties and the authority.  
 
A frame contract is similar to a frame agreement, except the owner commit him self to 
exclusively use the supplier that are given the contract to do the specific product delivery or 
services. 
 
4.6 Remuneration schemes 
All remuneration schemes have incentives in its natural structure. It is important to be 
conscious in the selection of remuneration schemes. The different schemes have different 
risks and direct incentives related too the scheme, and wrong use can result in elimination of 
critical elements in the task or project. The owner has to be aware that the project execution 
time often varies in the various remuneration schemes. Aker Offshore Partner does work 
under different remuneration schemes, and act in the accordance with incentives in the 
schemes.  
 
According to Lando, Henrik (2008) every transaction entails some degree of trust. Trust is a 
great aid to any kind of cooperation, but a relationship cannot be built in trust alone when the 
stakes are important. 
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4.6.1 Fixed-price/ Lump sum 
The owner pays the fixed price stipulated in the contract regardless of what costs the supplier 
is incurring. The price in its self is often emerged from a bid or offer. The advantage with this 
compensation scheme is that the final price of the project is more reliable. Amendments and 
change of scope have often evolved to conflicts and demanding bureaucratic processes. 
 
In order for fixed-price to be the optimal compensation scheme you need detail drawings and 
make sure that the number of amendments is low. 
 
Items to take in consider and risks that may arise in fixed- price compensation schemes: 
 Requirements and specifications can not be considerable changed without vital cost 
escalation. 
 The supplier doesn’t have the relevant competence to deliver satisfactory solutions 
within the requirements, and the owner have to involve beyond the terms and 
conditions. 
 The clauses in the contract or the description of the work have room for 
interpretation in such away that parties doest not agree. This might result in delays 
and cost escalation. 
 The supplier doesn’t have competence to estimate the work scope and don’t have the 
time or capacity to carry out the work. (winners course) 
Central risk factors: 
 Cost: The supplier doesn’t have the incentives to design for cost regarded to operation 
and life cycle cost. 
 Quality: Limited possibilities to influence design, concept and different materials. 
 Concept/technology: if not the technical definition degree in the project is on a high 
level, it might result in endless discussions related to amendments. If the scope of 
work is not well defined there is a big risk of budget overrun. 
 Central risk factors for the supplier: 
o The supplier bears the risk of own progress 
o The supplier bears the risk right specifications within the defined scope 
o The supplier is responsible for the cost estimate within the defined scope 
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 For both parties a risk factor is the chance of getting involved in a commercial dispute 
when it is uncertainty related to the projects degree of definition at the time of 
contract formation.  
 
4.6.2 Reimbursable payment 
The supplier is paid for all activities related to executing the project. The outcome of this is an 
uncertain final price of the project, but less likely to have conflicts regarding change in scope 
of work and amendments Often a control budget is established to control the work.  
 
Items to take in consider and risks that may arise in reimbursable payment schemes: 
 For the project owner: 
o Have the full responsibility and bear all risks related to cost variance from 
budget  
o Bear less risk related to quality because he can continuously influence the 
design 
o Bear all the risk of cost efficient design, also related to operating expenses and 
life cycle cost 
o If time is critical, this remuneration scheme have historical been the preferred 
solutions for efficient progress   
 
 For the supplier: 
o Bear the risk related to errors and delays. 
o The supplier can have delay risk related to the milestones. 
 
Reimbursable payment schemes have low risk related to legal dispute for both parties. 
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Table 4.A: Short evaluation of the remuneration schemes 
Selection criteria Fixed price Unit price Hour rate Reimbursable
Project definition High Medium Low Low 
Client Involvement   None None High High 
The markets capacity and 
competence  High High Low Low 
 
Remuneration scheme Fixed price Unit price Hour rate Reimbursable
The client is responsible for 
correct  N/A Quantities 
Quantities 
Norms 
Quantities 
Norms 
Rates 
The supplier bear the risk of 
correct   
Quantities 
Norms 
Rates 
Norms 
Rates Rates N/A 
The risk of contractual conflict  High Medium Low Low 
Supplier incentives for cost 
efficiency Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Supplier incentives for efficient 
solutions High Low Low Low 
The clients quality risk High High Low Low 
The clients progress risk  Exists Exists Low Low 
 
4.6.3 Target budget 
The supplier gets paid related to the outcome of the project in terms of the agreed target 
budget. Overrun or underrun is shared by the parties in terms of a formula, often with a cap 
for the supplier’s share of any overruns. The suppliers profit relates on the projects final cost, 
and how good he manage to execute the project with budget. The price format shall be an 
incentive to reduce the cost of the work and contribute to owner and supplier having the same 
objective in the execution of the work. 
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The target budget model determinates the profit for the supplier. It is often an agreed profit 
with zero over/under run, and a 50/50 distribution of the savings or overrun with a maximum 
cap for the supplier. The model can be used with both a lump sum, or as reimbursable with 
non-profit figures in the estimated target budget.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Outlines in the target budget model 
When the cap is reached for maximum loss in case of overrun, the supplier can not lose any 
more money on the project. When the cap is reached for maximum profit on underrun, the 
suppler still can have a larger profit if the final outcome of the project is significant lower 
then the estimated target budget.  
 
Items to take in consider and risks that may arise in target budget payment schemes: 
 For the owner: 
o The quality risk is lower then in fixed-price since target sum assume an 
integrated team and with that collaboration with optimizing of the design in the 
entire process. 
o The owner bears the risk of total cost reduction. 
o The use of target budget can complicate a tender process, as the profit 
distribution often is a result of a negotiation process. 
Maximum profit 
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in % of TB 
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Deviation from TB 
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when zero 
savings/underrun 
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Final cost of the project  
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o A historical fact is that suppliers often share the upside of the profit, but can 
face financial problems or bankruptcy, and not be able to contribute in case of 
overrun. 
o The suppler have a cap for the profit in most cases, and can give priority to 
more profitable projects.   
 For the supplier: 
o The supplier bear the risk related to efficiency and carry through of the project. 
o The supplier has large commercial risk. 
o The suppler have a cap for the profit in most cases, and can give priority to 
more profitable projects.  
o A cap in profit can result in lower profit in a “best result case” then with other 
remuneration schemes.  
 
On the basis of the supplier commercial risk often combined with a low degree of 
specification the risk of a legal dispute is in present. 
 
4.6.4 Unit price and hour rate 
Unit price 
The supplier gets paid bases on a predefined rate per unit, referred to as norms. These norms 
are used hours (man hours) per unit, weight, quantity, part etc. The figures are based on 
theory or experience updated with today’s cost picture. All expenditures for the supplier are 
estimated and counted in to the unit price. 
 
Hour rate 
Hour rate are cost per used hour (man hour). The hour rate often contains all expenditures for 
the supplier spited up as mark-up percentages added to the cost of a working hour. 
 
The price to be paid by the owner is the supplier set of norms multiplied with the “as-built” 
quantities and a possible risk mark-up. 
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Items to take in consider and risks that may arise in a payment by norms compensation 
schemes: 
 For the owner: 
o Quantity risk is in general the owner’s risk. 
o The total costs might be higher since the supplier not necessarily has the 
incentive for optimal design.  
 
 For the supplier: 
o Bear the risk related to the accuracy of rates and norms. 
o Bear the risk for low efficiency and bad quality, but get the upside in case of 
high efficiency, thereby high incentives for efficiency. 
 
The risk of a legal dispute is in present, but is lower then in use of fixed price or target budget. 
 
4.6.5 Remuneration in accordance with spot-price  
The resent times with large changes in raw material prices have initiated this remuneration 
scheme as a more fair way of regulate the contractual sum. The payment in the contract is set 
as a function of the spot price of input factor or a function of the spot price on sold product for 
the owner, here the oil price. These two methods can also be combined, but I have chosen to 
describe them separately. 
 
This remuneration scheme makes the two parties in the project share some off the up and 
down sides on factors that are out of there control. 
 
4.6.5.1 Spot price on raw materials as a remuneration scheme 
The supplier has big expenses on materials used in projects, and the price of these varies as a 
function of supply and demand. In periods of strong economic expansion the price might rise 
beyond all expectations, and can lead to large loss for the supplier. Often in the same period 
the owner will get more paid for his selling products, oil, with no difference for the supplier.  
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4.6.5.2 Spot price on oil as a remuneration scheme 
This remuneration scheme gives the owner and the supplier a joint platform for income. In 
general the profits of the two parties have been various in terms of the economic situations.  
 
Example of the use: 
 
Paid sum by the owner is a function of an agreed percentage fixed, and an agreed percentage 
related to the price of input factors, and possible price of oil. 
  
Ps = Pa * (0,6 + 0,4 * SPi / SP0) 
 
 Ps = The total contractual remuneration, Paid sum  
Pa = The agreed sum/ rate for remuneration 
 
 0,6 = The agreed share fixed, not to be adjusted by spot-price ( 0,6 just an example ) 
 0,4 = The agreed sum to be adjusted by spot-price  
  
SPi = spot-price materials or oil in period i  
SP0 = spot-price materials or oil in period 0 
 
It is important that the remuneration/settlement is done often to ensure that the paid sum and 
actual costs of raw material or sold product is close related. 
 
In Norway the governmental operated firm Statistics Norway, Statistisk sentralbyrå, publish 
monthly and weekly the price of oil, Brent blend, and other materials related to the industry in 
Norway. A monthly publication is also the Producer price index, with an own chapter 
regarding the extraction of oil and natural gas. This is just an example of a reliable source for 
the indexation related to spot prices. 
 
More used this type of remuneration scheme is discussed further on in chapter 6.2. 
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In the contracts it is often a segment with regulation regarding the salary and/or inflation or 
deflation. This is a function of the general price movement and is often a part of contract to 
reflect the change in prices. It is important to find the price index that reflects the actual costs 
for the supplier and not just the general price movement in the overall market. The indexes 
that are published give a price movement indicator of the market segment, but can be too 
superficial when it comes to prices in a specific work or project. 
 
The remuneration scheme as suggested is for regulating the paid cost in a project. For it to be 
successful it has to: 
 The regulating have to be linked to a credible index   
 The index have to be highly relevant to the costs of the project 
 
4.7 Variations 
According to Osmundsen P. (1999) a contract is in principle incomplete. It is expected that 
variations arise in the process of project execution. A contract often gives both parties right to 
issue variations and describes how the parties shall act when variations arise. 
 
4.7.1 Variation orders 
A variation order is a written variation to the already existing contract. The variation order 
describes the variation of the work that the supplier has to execute, the compensation for the 
extra work and the extension of the time scope. It is important to distinguish between 
renegotiation of a contract and variation within the frames of an existing contract. The 
variation can be initialized by the owner who issues a variation in the first initiated 
specifications, but also the supplier can come out with variations. The suppliers variations can 
be variations were the contracted work does not fit in with the actual construction. 
 
It is almost impossible to make a perfect system design, therefore it is expected in every 
project to have variations to the original design. It is not only in the design that variations may 
occur, but often also in the terms of the project. This might be environmental requirements, 
new tax legislations or safety demands. This can lead to a request from the owner to increase 
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or reduce the quality or quantity. It’s important to take in consideration that variation in scope 
of work is not covered by the regular contingency amount. 
 
Both parties can behave strategic to increase or reduce the total costs. The supplier can put 
forward more variations then the real foundation, or demand cover of extra cost that not actual 
occur. The owner can characterise a variation as a function improvement and not a function 
variation in order to not pay the supplier for the extra work.  
 
According to Clark, F.D. and Lorenzoni, A.B. (1997) the following steps shall be done in a 
variation order: 
1. Establish a written procedure and stick to it. 
2. As son as the procedure is proposed, is the authorised permit made with a temporary 
estimate. 
3. A detailed estimate is made as son as possible, don’t let this congest. 
4. Determinate the effect on the original project plan. 
5. As son as the variation is estimated an authorisation is given, adjust the original 
control estimate with cost code and incorporate the time effect on the schedule. 
6. If the variation order isn’t approved the cost of the preparation of variation order and 
estimate is added to the engineering budget. 
7. Let it be clear in both parties organisations that only written variation orders 
according to the procedures can lead to variation work. 
 
4.7.2 Negotiations about variation work  
What makes the negotiation about variation orders complicated is the fact that the contract is 
often signed before the actual detailed design is started. This is made to reduce the project 
execution time and leads to the parties enter into a contract that not regulates all relevant 
conditions. It is expected that variations occur on the way, and under renegotiations the power 
structure among the parties in the contract is essential. Good contracts have to contain 
mechanisms that protect both parties under renegotiations. 
 
Negotiations about variation work are inevitable in large projects in the petroleum business. 
This negotiation will have element of un-productive and non value added processes that are 
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destructive for the relation between the owner and the supplier. A great challenge is to reduce 
the discussions scope in variation orders. It is important to develop a contract and 
organisation that clearly define the distribution of responsibility. 
 
4.8 Adjustment in price, inflation revision 
Most contracts contain a sort of mechanism that adjusts the price initiated in the contract as the 
time goes by. These mechanisms can be adjustment for inflation or deflation, often adjusted in 
accordance with an agreed published index. Some contracts contain an annual price review in 
appreciation of relevant trade union settlements. 
 
When adjustment in accordance with a type of index, it is important to use an index that are 
applicable for the business area the contract are operating in, and represent the change in the 
actual cost for the supplier. It is often not possible to find an index that fully out covers the 
change of prices for the parties, and thereby the supplier has a risk in this area. This is applicable 
for all remuneration schemes, as they often have an agreed price either in lump sum, unit price or 
hour rates. 
 
An example in use of adjustment in case of inflation or deflation: 
The rates agreed in the contract (appendix B, table A) and are fixed until 31.12.2009. Afterwards 
the rates are to be adjusted 01.01 every year, first time 01.01.2010 in accordance to the following 
formula: 
  P1 = P0 x (L1 / L0) 
 
Where  P1 = Price after regulation 
 
  P0 = the contracts rate for 2009  
 L1 = the index for payment published by Statistics Norway,  
Industry oil and gas extraction for 3rd quarter ahead of the 
Year the adjustment is countable for.   
   L0 = same index that L1, but for 3rd quarter 2009  
 
It is not always that the whole price is adjusted, but only 80 % in example.  
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A fully out coverage for adjustment of prices related to factor inputs, are not common in 
contracts, and thereby the supplier bears a risk in this area.  
 
It is also a problem related to the competitive tender process if the contractual agreed price hade 
been adjusted many times, on diffuse basis. A contract can not cover all, but have to have 
guidance in how to act when problem of matter arise, this should also apply for change in the 
price with relation to the market prices. The supplier should take in consider variation in prices 
when a bid is placed. 
 
Statistic Norway publishes many different indexes and is wide used for adjustment in contracts 
in Norway.  
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5. Examination of the projects BP M&M- UGU and Tampen 
M&M 
In this chapter to projects with different clients and there use of the target budget model are 
presented. In the BP M&M contract it is the Modification assignment on Ula, and in the 
Statoil M&M contract is for the Tampen area in general. Aker Solutions operating system is 
presented with there project execution model and the estimation process. 
 
5.1 Short introduction to the projects 
5.1.1Ula  
Ula is a BP owned installation located south west in the North Sea in the Norwegian side. Ula 
started the production in 1986 and is currently producing from 7 wells, and are alternating 
injecting water and gas in 4 additional injection wells. The daily production is approximately 
10 000 oil equivalent. The installation consists of tree platform units, one production unit, one 
drilling unit and one living 
quarter unit. 
 
5.1.1.2 Ula gas upgrade  
BP decided to upgrade the gas 
unit because the capacity for 
gas treatment was fully used as 
a consequence of the 
connection with the Blane field.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Ula installation 
UGU will double the gas- handling capacity to 120 MMcf/d (million standard cubic feet pr 
day). Aker Offshore Partner was rewarded the contract in 2005 as a part of the maintenance 
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and modification frame agreement. Aker already had done some work on Ula with the 
upgrade and connection to the Blane field. 
 
The UGU project has a total budget of 615 mill NOK, with 1 335 tons weight handled and 
397 400 man hours. The project was sanctioned January 2006. 
 
Key figures for UGU: 
Grand total cost           615  MNOK 
Grand Total Weight Module      1.020  tons 
Handled Weight       1.335 tons 
Management     47.400  hours 
Engineering   120.000  hours 
Onshore Construction   161.000 hours 
Offshore Construction     69.000 hours 
  
5.1.2 Tampen M&M 
The maintenance and modification (M&M) contract between Aker Offshore Partner and 
Statoil (now StatoilHydro), that was signed in March 2002, have gradual involved all 
installation in the area Tampen in the northern part of the North Sea. Statfjord and Gullfaks 
was in from the start, Snorre came in July 2003 and the Visund-licence in May 2005.  
 
The contract leads to Aker Offshore Partner deliver about 2 million work hours in 
maintenance, modification and inspection at Tampen yearly. For AOP it is between 1100 and 
1200 persons engaged in the contract. One third of the contract is inspection and two third is 
EPCI work.  
  
The contract has a yearly value of approximately 1 billion NOK, excluded procurement that is 
arranged in StatoilHydro’s own SAP. The contract in one of the most important in AOP 
portfolio and contribute to almost a quarter of the turnover in AOP. 
 Master’s thesis  Fredrik Horne 
Industrial Economics   Spring 2009 
48 : 104
 
Figure 5.2: The Tampen area 
5.1.2.1 Statfjord 
Statfjord was discovered in 1974 and the field has been developed with the Statfjord A, B and 
C production platforms, which all have concrete gravity base structures incorporating storage 
cells. Statfjord A began production on 24 November 1979, Statfjord B followed on 5 
November 1982, and Statfjord C on 26 June 1985. 
Statfjord is one of the oldest producing fields on the Norwegian continental shelf, and the 
largest oil discovery in the North Sea. When drilling and well work are done on the field, 
about 200 people are employed on Statfjord A, 200 on the B platform and 240 on Statfjord C.  
 
5.1.2.2 Gullfaks 
Gullfaks has been developed with three large concrete production platforms. The Gullfaks A 
platform began production on 22 December 1986, with Gullfaks B following on 29 February 
1988 and the C platform on 4 November 1989. Since June 1994, Gullfaks C has received 
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andprocessed oil from the Tordis field. The A platform is used for storing and exporting 
stabilised crude from the Vigdis and Visund  
 
5.1.2.3 Snorre 
The Snorre development embraces two platforms, A and B. The Snorre A field has been 
producing oil and gas since August 1992, and the Snorre B platform came on stream in June 
2001. Snorre A is an integrated production, drilling and quarters unit and Snorre B is a semi-
submersible production, drilling and quarters unit is a floater and lies about seven kilometres 
north of the A platform 
 
5.1.2.4 Vidsund 
Visund is an oil and gas field located 22 kilometres north-east of the Gullfaks field in the 
Tampen area. The Visund field began producing oil in the spring of 1999, and later in October 
2005 also gas. Visund North is a separate subsea development about 10 kilometres from the 
platform. 
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5.2 Project Execution Model (PEM)  
5.2.1 Aker Solutions operating system  
Aker uses an operating system figure witch is build up in a hierarchic model witch PEM is a 
part of. The figure bellow illustrates the operating system. The operating system functions are 
as the following:  
Values and visions are highest in the 
hierarchic system and describe Aker 
Solutions values and vision. 
 
The governing documents are regulations 
and legislations, standards and 
specifications together with Aker 
Solutions directive and strategy. 
 
Strategy describes how Aker Solutions 
establish and maintain the business 
strategy and other strategies. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Aker Solutions operating system  
People describe how Aker Solutions work to obtain the goals in the people policy. 
 
Operations describe the how processes are carried out and the underlying support functions. 
 
Delivery process, Project Execution Model, describes how Aker Solutions goes through with 
and control the projects from identifying a possible delivery until fulfillment of any 
guaranteed obligation and after sale activity. Work processes that are triggered from 
identification of a potential delivery are included in the process.  
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Business development describes the activities performed to continuously improve Aker 
Solutions relationship to the costumers, and also the development of products and services, 
technology included. 
 
Health, safety and environment describe the work processes to ensure the implementation of 
an HSE mindset and reach defined HSE goals. 
 
Quality improvement describes the work process that Aker Solutions uses to: 
- Maintain the Operating System. 
- Measure the effect of the work process i.e. KPI’s, audits, and verifications. 
- Measure the systems effectiveness and accomplish improvements of the units 
operation. 
 
Communication describes the work processes aimed to ensure controlled communication 
internally in the unit, to media and other stakeholders. 
 
Finance describes the working process to ensure the unit’s financial goals and financial 
control.  
 
Resources and Infrastructure describes the work processes to establish and maintain the unit’s 
infrastructure which are part of their permanent assets, and the optimum utilisation of these 
and people resources. 
 
5.2.2 Project execution model 
PEM is the project execution model used in Aker Solutions. The project execution model 
consists of different phases related to the scope of work. The structure of the PEM varies with 
the scope of work. In the projects examined in this thesis the PEM models related to scope of 
work varies from modification tasks, maintenance to M&M frame agreement work. 
 
Instead of describing the three PEM models separate, I have chosen to describe the 
modification PEM model used for projects, as many of these phases also are in the PEM 
models for the examined projects. 
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Figure 5.4: PEM Modifications 
The PEM is used as a guidance trough the different steps in the execution of the project.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Strategic level 
 
5.2.2.1 Phase 1 Feasibility & Concept 
 
Figure 5.6: Phase 1 Feasibility & Concept 
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The main objective of the feasibility and concept phase is to develop the best possible 
business case and winning solution for the client. The phase is also named the value-
engineering phase. The concept to be used is selected in this phase and thereby the project 
CAPEX and OPEX levels are defined. The following stages with related milestones are part 
of phase one: 
 1A Opportunity appraisal 
 1B Feasibility studies 
 1C Concept selection 
 1D Concept definition 
 
5.2.2.2 Phase 2 System definition 
 
Figure 5.7: Phase 2 System definition 
The main objective of the system definition phase is to detail the concept and freeze system 
design, implement supplier information and complete the area design to a level where the 
interfaces between the systems and various areas are frozen. The following stages with related 
milestones are part of phase two: 
 2A System definition 
 2B System design and layout development 
 2C Global design 
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5.2.2.3 Phase 3 Detailing & Fabrication 
 
Figure 5.8: Phase 3 Detailing & Fabrication  
The main objective of the detailing and fabrication phase is to complete detail design, prepare 
fabrication documentation, and fabricate the module to mechanical completion status. 
Perform onshore commissioning and make the module ready for sail-away. The following 
stages with related milestones are part of phase three: 
 3A Detail design  
 3B Work preparation 
 3C Pre fabrication 
 3D Fabrication 
 
5.2.2.4 Phase 4 Assembly/Erection 
 
Figure 5.9: Phase 4 Assembly/Erection 
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The main objective of the assembly/erection phase is to transport and offshore install the 
module and all components and pre-assemblies in accordance with the installation method. 
The following stages with related milestones are part of phase four: 
 4A Transport and positioning 
 4B Offshore installation 
 
5.2.2.5 Phase 5 System completion 
 
Figure 5.10: Phase 5 System completion 
The main objective of the system completion phase is to commission the installed or modified 
system in a safe manner, in accordance with pre-defined commissioning plans and 
procedures. Perform the handover to operation and close-out the project. The following stages 
with related milestones are part of phase five: 
 5A Commissioning 
 5B Close-out 
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5.3 Estimation in M&M projects 
Estimation in project is a cost identifying process. In this process the cost of the products and 
related processes are identified. These figures are usually used for the budget in the project, 
and can also be used in the target budget (without profit). 
 
AOP does estimation in different phases in M&M projects: 
 Front end studies, at feasibility studies 40 % uncertainty  
 Estimation for tenders, at concept definition 20 % uncertainty 
 Estimation in projects 
 
Figure 5.11: The estimation loop describes the dynamic process of estimation in AOP.  
 
AOP uses estimation models for front end studies, weight based estimation and quantity based 
estimation. In general we distinguish between two different estimation methods, synthetic and 
analytic. These estimation methods are used in different phases in the project. 
Processing 
data 
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Synthetic, top-down 
o Relation estimating, how one estimate relates to another adjusted for: 
 Capacity 
 Time 
 Place 
 Size 
o Factor estimating, determine how an estimate varies related to one “fixed” 
item, i.e. total cost based on equipment cost. 
 Analytic, bottom-up 
o Break down estimating 
o Splits estimate in details (work packs) and estimates them separately, down to 
unit or ton level 
 
5.3.1 Practical approach with estimation in projects 
The estimation uses updated and experience based figures for estimating the work to be done. 
The estimate aim at customising the project with correction factors adjusted for the 
environment and uniqueness of the project. The most important correction factors to consider 
in the estimate are: the project complexity, the technological development, factors about the 
location and place of the project. Based on this estimates is established and include typical 
elements like: 
 Direct work 
o Prefabrication 
o Assembly 
o Installation and demolition (integration, hook-up, site work) 
 Indirect work 
 Non productive time (lost time) 
 Engineering 
 Management 
 Procurement 
 3rd party services 
 Allowance 
 Contingency 
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When these elements are calculated, the estimated cost is identified and can be used as a 
budget. This is an example of elements that can identify the total cost, but the contract decides 
witch of the elements that shall be calculated, and how the cost shall be accounted.  
 
5.4 The use of target budget in BP M&M and Tampen M&M 
5.4.1 The use of Target budget in BP M&M 
This chapter is based on the actual contract in the terms of target budget. The contract is a 
modification and maintenance support contract for BP’s oil installations Valhall, Hod, Ula 
and Tambar.  
 
Target budget is used in the contract with BP in the UGU project. The intention is that this 
compensation model shall be the main model for modification work under the contract. 
 
From the contract it says the following: 
 
“The price format shall be an incitement to reduce the cost of the work and contribute to 
company (BP) and contractor (Aker Offshore Partner) having the same objective in the 
execution of the work under a given order. The price format incorporates an incentive concept 
whereby reduced cost for company means greater profit for the contractor. Similarly, the 
contractor’s profit is reduced in the event of increased cost for the company” 
 
This theory is common known and has the easy incentive principle like “carrot and stick”. 
The contractor will be awarded if a better result then the budget, or punished with a financial 
loss if a worse result.  
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Included as the basis for the remuneration consist the following components: 
 Compensation for hour accrued based on net cost and any variable and/or fixed price 
components. 
 A variable profit/loss component depending on final cost measured against the target 
budget. 
 The contractor’s accrued hourly costs are invoiced periodically in accordance with 
agreed invoicing routines. 
 
When the work under a given order is completed, savings/overruns in relation to the target 
Budget will be calculated by contractor and company. 
 
Breakdown of the price format 
The breakdown of the price format is formulated in compliance with the company’s 
requirements. The structure of the price format will form the basis for reporting of the work 
under a given order. 
 
The price format is structured with a view to achieving, consistency between the cost, hours 
and quantities involved in the execution of the work under a given order an the target budget. 
 
Main phases and activities are designed to harmonise with modification work of all types. 
Structuring is consistent with Norsok Standard Z-014 Standard Cost Coding System. 
 
Basis for target budget 
The personnel related costs, in connection with the work under a given order are defined as 
the target budget excluding profit. 
 
Company cost and contingency shall be excluded from the target budget model. 
 
The contractor is compensated through net cost rates for accrued hours in relevant categories. 
 
At the completion of an order, it will be clear whether the contractor is entitled to further 
remuneration in the form of profit as a result of the price format’s incentive adjustment. 
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The final target budget is calculated on the basis of the following: 
 Weights/quantities calculated on the basis of the final design documentation (“as 
built”) from prefabrication and installation. 
 The contract norms 
 Average invoiced net cost rates within each project phase. 
 
Determination of profit 
When the work under a given order is completed, the target budget shall be updated based on 
actual quantities. This revised budget is defined as the final target budget. 
 
Contractors profit shall be calculated on the basis of the final target budget for the work, and 
shall contain a variable profit component that varies with cost savings or overruns relative to 
the estimated target budget. 
 
The following principle, illustrated by means of a linear graph, shall apply to adjustment of 
profit: 
 Contractor’s profit with zero over/underrun of the target budget amounts to 3,5% of 
the final target budget for the assignment. 
 Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is -4%, at 15% overrun 
of final target budget. 
 Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is 13,5%, at 20% 
underrun of final target budget. 
 A straight line is drawn between the points defined above as shown in the figure 
bellow.  
 The line shall express a risk profile of 50/50 distribution of under/overruns of final 
cost in relation to the final target budget. 
 The form of the linear graph shall be continuous. The slope of the linear graph shall 
not be adjusted in the contract  
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Figure 5.12: Initiated target budget model in BP M&M 
The original contracts dated 1st of April 2005, and the signing is 12th of May 2005, but 
later on as the project is executed a new amendment regarding the target budget is sign. 
The amendment number 2, is dated 12th of December 2006 and signed 24th of January 
2007. 
 
In general the contract has the same concepts and regulations on the target budget, but 
some of the percentages in the determination of the profit have been changed. 
 
Now these following principles shall apply to adjustment of profit: 
 Contractor’s profit with zero over/underrun of the target budget amounts to 6,5% of 
the final target budget for the assignment. 
 Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is -1%, at 15% overrun 
of final target budget for the assignment. 
 Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is 16,5%, at 20% 
underrun of final target budget for the assignment. 
 
In general this increases the profit for Aker in any case, and is more profitable in under run or 
zero. The new condition also reduces the downside if overrun. 
You can ask if it almost take away the “stick”, and at the same time putting a bigger “carrot” 
in front. These new contract conditions were settled as a part of the market situation with 
higher activity in the industry.  
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5.4.1.1 An analyse of the Target Budget Model and practical experience in the project 
 
Figure 5.13: The target budget model in BP M&M 
The current target budget model initiated in the contract will be like the over going figure. 
The down side is low in the work, much because of the blooming time fore the industry when 
the contract was renegotiated. 
 
To establish the estimated target budget Aker uses estimated quantities and experience based 
system for calculating the ETB. The cost of this is based on experience with adjustments, and 
will not be applicable for every single project, but level out in the long run. 
 
This estimated target budget and the estimate in general have been an ongoing discussion with 
the client. The client have done some sampling and compared with the ETB, and did not agree 
about the related cost. This has result in conflicts in determination of the target budget, and 
has lead to very little use of target budget as a remuneration scheme in this contract.  
Profit 16,5 % 
of TB 
Loss 1,0 %  
of TB  
Pr
of
it 
- 20 % Savings + 15 % Overrun  
Deviation from TB 
Profit 6,5 % 
of TB 
Final Target Budget 
Final cost of the project  
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The commercial personnel in the project point out the agreed settlement according to the 
contract for the target budget, but there still is a conflict and thereby remuneration is mostly 
done as a reimbursable basis. 
 
As a natural of the estimate the figures are not exactly, but based on historical figures, 
adjusted to the specifications in the project. The figures shall not include profit. If you do a 
spot check the figures might not be completely realistic with the actual cost, but this is the 
nature of an estimate. In the long run this shall reflect the costs in the project. Since AOP are 
paid based on the final design, and the rates related to these products, the problem is not of 
extensive matters. 
 
Figure 5.14: The mathematical principle in the target budget model in BP M&M 
This model shows the mathematical principle of the target budget model and the 50/50 
distribution of under or overruns. A overrun of 15 % gives a 7,5 % lower profit then agreed 
profit when zero over- or underrun. 
 
For the graph to be linear the profit or loss distribution have to be in relation and at the graph. 
The figures in maximum profit and loss are a direct output of the determined profit in case of 
zero under/overrun. The cap in maximal profit and loss is often established in the negotiation 
situation. 
 
16,5 % 
6,5 %
-1 % 
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If given the profit 6,5 % in case of zero under/overrun, the figures in maximum profit and loss 
will be: 
 
Underrun 20 % : 6,5 % + (20 %  x 0,5) = 16,5 % 
Overrun 15 % : 6,5 % ÷ (15 % x 0,5) = - 1 % 
 
When the cap is reached for underrun ( 20 %) AOP can still make more profit in the scope of 
work, but the performance profit is limited to 16,5 % of the final target budget. 
 
If for example in a project the final target budget is 100 million NOK. 
 
If the actual cost is 50 million NOK, AOP’s profit will be 16,5 million. In percentages of 50 
millions 16,5 millions is: 
 
16,5 / 50  = 0,33 = 33 % 
 
This means that Aker in general can have profit over 16,5 % of the real cost in the project, but 
newer more then 16,5 % of the final target budget. 
 
5.4.2 Target budget in Tampen Maintenance and Modification contract 
The maintenance and modification contract between Aker Offshore Partner and Statoil (now 
StatoilHydro), that was signed in March 2002, and with the redeemable option the contract go 
on to at least February 2011.  
 
The contract is one of the most important in AOP portfolio and contribute to almost a quarter 
of the turnover in AOP. 
 
StatoilHydro’s intention in having all licence under the same contract is to save money trough 
the Supplier and Owner developing a common practice in M&M.  
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The contract in it self is a 25 pages document, based in the Norwegian Total Contract 05/92. 
In addition to the contract it is 11 attachments, from A to L, and a range of amendments to the 
contract. 
 
The actual title of the contract is Contract 4600004730 “Kontrakt for vedlikehold og 
modifikasjoner”, translated to Contract for maintenance and modifications. The contract is 
original in Norwegian, so the content is translated. 
 
5.4.2.1 The contracts reference to Target budget 
In Attachment B the remuneration is described: 
 
Target budget 
 
Intention 
Company’s (StatoilHydro) intention is that this compensation model shall be the main model 
for modification work under the contract. 
 
The model may be applicable for a combined portfolio defined as the order. It shall be clear 
from the order what modification and improvement that take part in the order. It will however 
also be of interest to use the remuneration model for single standing modification work. 
 
Target budget general principles 
The price format shall be an incitement to reduce the cost of the work and contribute to 
company and contractor having the same objective in the execution of the work. The price 
format incorporates an incentive concept whereby reduced cost for company means greater 
profit for the contractor. Similarly, the contractor’s profit is reduced in the event of increased 
cost for the company. 
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Included as the basis for the remuneration consist the following components: 
 
Compensation for hour accrued based on net cost and any variable and/or fixed price 
components. 
 
A variable profit/loss component depending on final cost measured against the target 
budget. 
 
The contractor’s accrued hourly costs are invoiced periodically in accordance with agreed 
invoicing routines. 
 
When the work under a given order is completed, savings/overruns in relation to the target 
Budget will be calculated by contractor and company according to agreed profit/loss graph, 
ref figure 5.15 
 
Breakdown of the price format 
The breakdown of the price format is formulated in compliance with the company’s 
requirements. The structure of the price format will form the basis for reporting of the work 
under a given order. 
 
The price format is structured with a view to achieving, consistency between the cost, hours 
and quantities involved in the execution of the work under a given order and the target 
budget. 
 
Main phases and activities are designed to harmonise with modification work of all types. 
Structuring is consistent with Standard Cost Coding System with a few adjustments to 
harmonise better with the general conditions related to execution of the modification work.   
 
Basis for target budget 
Generally 
The working related costs, hours and rent of equipment under a given order, are defined as the 
target budget excluding profit. 
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Company will in every single case determine if the offshore extra fee will take part in the 
target budget model. 
 
The contractor is compensated through net cost rates for accrued hours in relevant categories 
and rental of equipment in accordance with the supplier’s rates for equipment rental. 
 
At the completion of an order, it will be clear whether the contractor is entitled to further 
remuneration in the form of profit as a result of the price format’s incentive adjustment. 
 
The final target budget is calculated on the basis of the following: 
 Weights/quantities calculated on the basis of the final design documentation (“as 
built”) from prefabrication and installation 
 The contracts offered norms 
 Average invoiced net cost rates within each project phase 
 Estimated cost of equipment rental  
 
Summary of used hours and costs 
Column 1 Estimated hours reflects final estimated hours for every single item with on the 
basis of the “as built” weights/quantities and the contract norms included 
offered factors 
 
Column 2 Net cost rates average for every single item. In calculation of final target 
budget shall average net cost rate be calculated based on actual invoiced hours 
within every item 
 
Column 3 Target budget reflects work related costs and is a expression of cost where the 
supplier have a large degree of influence 
 Master’s thesis  Fredrik Horne 
Industrial Economics   Spring 2009 
68 : 104
 
The following form is not to be filled out, but made as an orientation of the structure of the 
target budget and the total cost of the project.  
Table 5.A: A structure orientation of the target budget model 
SAB COR Cost element Estimated 
hours 
Net Cost 
rates aver. 
Target 
budget 
  Column  1 2 3 
2 C 2.1 Ini. Items – fixed-price elements    
2 C 2.1 Ini. Items – variable-price elements,   
equipment rental 
   
4 C 3    Project management     
2 K 4    Design    
41 L 5    Fabrication onshore    
44 L/M 6    Installation offshore    
447 L/M 7    System test out    
53 X 9.1.5 Offshore extra fee  160  
  Total Hours / target budget    
4 C Profit    
                        Material cost  
31 E 8.1 Procurement equipment    
32 B 8.2 Procurement bulk    
  StatoilHydro mng. and logistics    
      
  Deduction offshore extra fee  160  
      
  Estimated project total costs    
 
 
= Not to be filled out , SAB   = Standard Activity Breakdown 
COR  = Code Of Resource 
 
Determination of profit 
When the work under a given order is completed, the target budget shall be updated based on 
actual quantities. This revised budget is defined as the final target budget. 
 
Contractors profit shall be calculated on the basis of the final target budget for the work, and 
shall contain a variable profit component that varies with cost savings or overruns relative to 
the estimated target budget. 
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The following principle, illustrated by means of a linear graph, shall apply to adjustment of 
profit: 
 
a. Contractor’s profit with zero over/underrun of the target budget amounts to 3,5% of 
the final target budget for the assignment. 
b. Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is -4%, at 15% overrun 
of final target budget. 
c. Contractor’s profit reaches its maximum positive level, which is 13,5%, at 20% 
underrun of final target budget. 
d. A straight line is drawn between the points defined above as shown in the figure 
bellow. The line shall express a risk profile of 50/50 distribution of under/overruns of 
final cost in relation to the final target budget. 
 
The form of the linear graph shall be continuous. The slope of the linear graph shall not 
be adjusted in the contract. 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Initiated target budget model in Tampen M&M 
Profit (%) 
Deviation in % from TB 
Profit when zero over-/underrun of TB 
Agreed maximum loss 
% overrun of TB where 
profit reaches largest 
negative value 
Figure with relationship between costs and profit 
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5.4.2.2 An analyse of the Target Budget Model and practical experience in the project 
 
Figure 5.16: The target budget model in Tampen M&M 
The target budget model initiated in the contract will be like the figure 5.16. The 50/50 
distribution is an underlying principle for the model and determines the graph in the figure, 
based on the profit when zero under- or overrun the profit/loss in the cap is automatically set.  
 
The 3,5 % profit was established in a negotiation process with the client. The times for the oil 
and gas industry in 2001 was not very profitable and a profit of 3,5 % was agreed as a result 
of the situation.  
 
Later on Aker have tried to renegotiate the contract and the profit rate in the target budget 
model as a strong development in the salary and expenditures in the oil and gas industry, but 
without success. The contract was awarded in a tender process and strict rules are set to 
encourage a competitive marked. Thereby Aker have to stick with there profit, but the rates in 
personnel wage and equipment are regulated in an indexation process, but only 80 %. For 
personnel wage the Statistic Norway wage index in category industry wage is used. And in 
rental equipment the consumer price index is used.  
Profit 13,5 % 
of TB  
Loss 4,0 %  
of TB 
Pr
of
it 
- 20 % Savings + 15 % Overrun 
Deviation from TB 
Profit 3,5 % 
of TB 
Final Target Budget 
Agreed maximum loss  
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StatoilHydro have on there side justified the refusal of meeting the claims of higher rates with 
the fairness of a tender process, there responsibility to keep the cost in the industry low and 
help the Norwegian supplier industry be competitive in the world market. 
 
Still the extreme evolve of cost in the oil industry was not taken in consideration when 
calculating the bid, and thereby the contract is not very profitable for AOP, but still it develop 
employees and knowledge within the company.  
 
Figure 5.17: The mathematical principle in the target budget model in Tampen M&M 
The mathematical principle of the target budget model is as the figure above. The function is 
automatically set as the profit is determined. (For further info, see section 5.4.1.1)  
 
If given the profit 3,5 % in case of zero under/overrun, the figures in maximum profit and loss 
will be: 
 
Underrun 20 % : 3,5 % + (20 %  x 0,5) = 13,5 % 
   
Overrun 15 % : 3,5 % ÷ (15 % x 0,5) = - 4 % 
13,5 % 
3,5 %
-4 % 
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The model underneath is a practical example from the project. The example has estimated 
weight; steel 500 ton and piping 300 ton. The rate is also slightly adjusted in the final target 
budget as an outcome of the indexation. 
Table 5.B: Target budget settlement in Tampen M&M 
Target budget settlement Tampen 
 
Preliminary target budget 
Discipline  
Weight Norm Hours Rate 
Cost excl. 
profit 
Steel 500 130 65 000 475 30 875 000
Piping 300 180 54 000 470 25 380 000
Design steel 38%   24 700 510 12 597 000
Design piping 60%   32 400 520 16 848 000
Management 12,9%   22 717 525 11 926 372
Rate = Estimated full cost 198 817 491 97 626 372
 
Final target budget 
Discipline  
Weight Norm Hours Rate 
Cost excl. 
profit 
Steel 505 130 65 650 480 31 512 000
Piping 305 180 54 900 476 26 147 058
Design steel 38%   24 947 515 12 847 705
Design piping 60%   32 940 525 17 293 500
Management 12,9%   23 018 530 12 199 738
Rate = Actual full cost 201 455 496 100 000 000
 
Performance Hours Rate 
Cost excl. 
profit TB profit 
Perform-
ance profit Total profit 
I. Invoiced 80% of TB 161 164 496 80 000 000 3 500 000 10 000 000 13 500 000
II. Invoiced 85% of TB 171 237 496 85 000 000 3 500 000 7 500 000 11 000 000
III. Invoiced 90% of TB 181 310 496 90 000 000 3 500 000 5 000 000 8 500 000
IV. Invoiced 85% of TB 191 383 496 95 000 000 3 500 000 2 500 000 6 000 000
V. Invoiced 100% of TB 201 455 496 100 000 000 3 500 000 - 3 500 000
VI. Invoiced 105% of TB 211 528 496 105 000 000 3 500 000 -2 500 000 1 000 000
VII. Invoiced 110% of TB 221 601 496 110 000 000 3 500 000 -5 000 000 -1 500 000
VIII. Invoiced 115% of TB 231 674 496 115 000 000 3 500 000 -7 500 000 -4 000 000
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5.4.3 The use of target budget over and under the profit-deviation cap 
The result of the project can be over and under the estimated sum of the project. The majority 
of the work has so far been within the agreed boundaries of the target budget model. Still 
some work has been over or under the agreed cap.  
 
The figure show work within the Tampen M&M project that have a result that are over and 
under the profit-deviation cap.  
 
Figure 5.18: Profit-deviation cap Tampen M&M 
When the cap is reached the supplier can not have more profit or loss based on the final target 
budget. In case of underrun over the cap he still can have more profit on the actual work, but 
not more then 13,5 % of final target budget. 
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The following is an example of a project with underrun over the cap.  
 
Example in use 
Final target budget  100 000 000 NOK
Actual cost (excl profit)    50 000 000 NOK
Difference FTB – actual cost    50 %
 
TB profit     3 500 000 NOK
Performance profit 10 000 000 NOK
 
The total profit 13,5% of FTB 13 500 000 NOK
 
Actual invoiced included profit 63 500 000 NOK 
Actual invoiced profit 13 500 000 NOK
 
Profit percent of actual cost/ work   13 500 000/ 50 000 000 = 0,27 = 27 % 
 
Maximum profit is reached at 80 % invoiced of final target budget, and the owner does not 
pay more then this, still the supplier can gain more profit on the actual costs. This example 
statutes that the profit can be over 13,5 % of the laid down work, but newer more then 13,5 % 
of the final target budget. 
 
This extra profit can be achieved as a result of faster and better work then estimated. The 
actual work is then done at a lower price then the contractual rates. In a fixed price contract 
this is a stronger incentive then in target budget remuneration since the supplier keeps all the 
savings. In theory the supplier can shift his resources to a more profitable project went ha cap 
is reached. 
 
The result can also be an overrun of the target budget, and the supplier has to take a share off 
the loss. The cap in this contract is 4 % off the final target budget. After this cap is reached 
the incentives goes away for AOP as the supplier.  
 
5.4.4 StatoilHydro as the client 
StatoilHydro is dominant as an oil company on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and Aker 
Offshore Partners largest client. Aker and StatoilHydro have worked closely together since 
the discovery of oil in the North Sea. In this way the two companies know each other well and 
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know what are expected to gain success. Unfortunately it is not easy to keep this transfer of 
experience in every project since there often is new people, new regulation and new 
technology in projects, but consensus is the same. 
 
AOP have done work for StatoilHydro compensated based on target budget model in many 
projects, and the guidance and practical experience with the model is gained. This can be 
some of the reasons for the model function so well at the Tampen M&M projects. 
 
5.5 Frame agreements with subcontractors  
In the same way Aker Solutions are in frame agreement contracts with there clients, they also 
have frame agreements with there subcontractors. This to reduce the administrative cost 
secures a stabile delivery with agreed quality and competitive prices.   
 
Sometimes in projects Aker also use the clients frame agreements, but just when the client 
want to or require this. 
 
Figure 5.19: Frame agreements, added value in order of priority  
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In Aker Solutions frame agreements the focus is in general on: 
 General terms and conditions 
 Prices 
 Availability / Lead times 
 Quality of supply chain 
 
Example of frame agreements within the Aker solutions system is the frame agreement for 
steel products with the Norwegian steel delivery company, Norsk Stål AS. 
The contract with Norsk Stål gives Aker discounts in accordance with the product- catalogue. 
The agreement is negotiated for the Aker system to ensure good prices and availability of 
materials. The price agreed in the frame agreements are percentage-discounts at products to 
the product-catalogue. The different products have different discounts, but a rough average of 
30 % discount. The price Aker pays is regulated by Norsk Stål and there cost elements. There 
catalogue price varies with the price of steel and are often changed in accordance with the 
steel price.   
 
A problem Aker can face as a large supplier in the oil and gas industry is the many 
subcontractors they have in projects. In there contracted and ongoing projects can the failure 
of one subcontractor make Aker lose lot of money, even more then the contracted sum with 
the failing subcontractor. 
 
Example: 
 Main contract value 100 MNOK 
 Liquidated damage (LD) for delay in max is 10 % of the contract sum, which equals to 
10 MNOK 
 Identical LD’s transfer; max 10 % 
 Subcontract value 20 MNOK 
 Liquidated damage for delay is max. 10 %, equals to 2 MNOK 
 
 This is not back-to back, and means great loss because of a subcontractor.  
 
In order to have back-to-back conditions, the subcontractors maximal LD should be 50 % of 
the contract sum, which equals to 10 MNOK. No subcontractor with a common sense will 
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enter into this type of contract. Thereby Aker bear a quite large risk in these contracts, with 
critical delivery from subcontractors. 
 
The frame agreements do not need to be on exclusive supply basis, and could be bases on the 
competitive bidding anyway. Frame agreement work as a one way commitment for the 
supplier and it is common practise for the owner to have several frame agreements within one 
market sector with multiple suppliers. The supplier that offers the best bid, win the tender.  
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6. Discussion  
In this chapter the target budget model is discussed, both in relation to practical experience 
from the projects, the mathematical concepts of the model, the handling of variations, 
establishing of cap and the basic concept of the model. The spot price remuneration scheme is 
discussed and some practical examples are illustrated, with link to reliable indexes.  
 
6.1 Discussion Target budget 
The target budget model as remuneration scheme is frequent used much because both the 
parties, the supplier and the owner, can easily see the mutual benefits related to the common 
goal, and the incentive to pull in the same direction. The main function is to have the same 
objective in the execution of the work 
 
However under what conditions the target sum is set is not that easy to clearly give an answer 
to. What is behind the figures and how the parts came up with this exact figures is often 
established in a tender process with negotiations. 
 
When talking about TB, we often operate with three different dimensions of numbers/figures. 
We have: 
 Estimated TB: the estimate of the work based on historical numbers and future 
forecast of the work often established by the supplier, much like a budget.  
 Final TB: the model that determinate the profit for the supplier based on final design, 
actual as built quantities and installed elements, often in consistence with the contracts 
norms and rates. The difference in FTB from ETB can be small or big variation in the 
scope, new technology to be implemented or other unforeseen events. 
 Actual occurred costs: the real cost that have been on the project, equipment, 
personnel and materials all the way in the executing parts organisation. 
 
The profit is calculated from the difference between Final TB and actual invoiced costs. 
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6.1.1 The structure of a Target budget 
The steps in a target budget (TB) in the Tampen M&M contract: 
 Establish estimated TB before start of work under a given order, in most cases the TB 
is established in the study phase of the project, before biding 
 Get paid for accrued hours, full cost/ without profit, during the process 
 The difference between Final Target Budget and actual accrued hours determinates the 
profit 
 
6.1.2 The mathematical formula for profit within agreed cap 
Within the agreed cap the profit/loss in a final target budget settlement can be explained with 
a mathematical formula. Determination of profit within agreed cap: 
Y = (TB-AC) / 2 + TB * X 
Explanations of the formula: 
Y = profit in NOK 
X = agreed profit in % when zero over- or underrun of Target budget 
TB = Target budget 
AC = Actual Cost 
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6.1.3 Example of the structure of a target budget in piping: 
It is common to start the work by estimating the given order. An example of this is from 
estimating a work with a one ton pipe. 
 
The purpose of the target budget is that Aker together with the client shall save money by 
being more efficient and share the profit. 
Direct work: 
Example fabrication and installation of 1 ton pipe 5” CS: 
Man hours for fabrication and installation is calculated from handled quantities and 
contractual norms 
 
 Fabrication hours = norm x quantities  155 hours 
 Installation = norm x quantities  104 hours 
 System testing         5 hours 
 Total Direct hours (pipe)   264 hours 
 
Management and design: 
Direct hours create basis for calculation of hours for management and projecting: 
 Design, pipe (60 % x 264) =   158 hours 
 Design, multi discipline (29 % x 158) =    46 hours  
Management* (12,9 % x 468) =    60 hours 
 Total mgr. & proj.     264 hours   
  
Total target budget (ETB) 528 hours** 
    
* Hours for task managers, cost, planning, estimation, document control, supply chain 
and installation coordinators onshore 
 
** Factors for indirect hours, working foremen, fire guard, non destructive testing, 
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6.1.4 Why the estimated target budget (ETB) is important: 
 The ETB give control information under the execution of the project 
 Gives AOP a opportunity to achieve better profit 
 Gives AOP a field for training regarding the estimating of fixed-price projects 
 Inputs for a ETB contributes to improvement of AOP prognosticated cost by 
improving procurement estimate and prognosticated profit 
 A ETB in the study phase act as a check point where AOP can evaluate job stated and 
installed quantity up against estimated quantities in the study phase 
 
6.1.5 Variations and handling of variations 
When talking about variations you distinguish between two types, the total variation of 
contract and variations within the frame of existing contract. It is the last variation that is 
discussed further on in this chapter. 
 
Compensation of variations in relations to target budget: 
 Weight related variations are compensated by the company trough revise of the TB, 
possibly with new quantities. The result becomes a final target budget with upward 
adjusted quantities when the project is finished. All variations in weight shall be 
reported in the variation system where the value increases.   
 Non-weight variations are compensated by the company trough that the value of the 
variation is deducted from incurred cost in the final settlement.  
 Internal variations as a result of adjustments in the plan can affect the productivity 
factor and thereby the result of the target budget. Example a high use of man-hours 
because of correction of errors    
 
Non-weight variations: Variations that can not be compensated trough the contractual norms, 
examples re-design. 
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6.1.5.1 The use of non-weight variations 
If the non-weight variations aren’t calculated in the figures and then adjusted, the result will 
be wrong and give a lower profit, example: 
 
 
Figure 6.1: TB model without calculated and adjusted non-weight variations   
This figure explains the result of the project when the non-weight variations are not calculated 
in the target budget. This will lead to a different outcome of the project, herby represented 
with a loss of 150.000 NOK as a result of the project. 
It is important to take in consideration the variations when calculating the profit in the target 
budget, and not just in the payment for the actual change in work as a result of the variation. 
To emphasise this I will also present the model with the calculated and adjusted figures for 
non weight variations, and compare the two models.  
Same example, but the non-weight variations are calculated and adjusted as part of the 
figures: 
Pr
of
it 
- 20 %  + 15 % 
Deviation from TB 
3,5 %  
Estimated target budget 
10 M. NOK 
 
Actual accrued hour cost 
11 M. NOK   
 
Deviation 
1 M NOK = 10 % 
overrun 
 
Profit % 
-10/2 + 3,5 = - 1,5 % 
 
Profit NOK 
-1,5 % x 10 M = 
-150.000 NOK (loss) 
 
 
- 4 %  
13,5 % 
10 % 
overrun 
- 1,5 %
Target budget model without calculated and adjusted non-weight variations 
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Figure 6.2: TB model calculated and adjusted for non-weight variations 
The two models show a result of respectively 150.000 NOK losses and 100.000 NOK profit. 
This lead to a variance of 250.000 NOK, or 2,5 % of the total target budget. This is just an 
example, but emphasis the importance of right handling of variations, also in commercial 
relations.  
 
6.1.5.2 The use of weight related variations 
Weight related variations are easier to handle, as they are compensated by the company 
trough revise of the target budget with new quantities. The weights that are handled and the 
products that are purchased have already costs and will be compensated as regular work. The 
compensation will be like the ordinary target budget, but with a new higher figure for the 
target budget.  
 
6.1.5.3 Variations in general 
This chapter shows that variances are no problems in target budgets when handled right. The 
supplier gets paid for the variation work, and gets an incentive based profit related to this 
work equal to all other work under the target budget. The problem can be the commercial 
understanding of variation work and way to act when variations emerge.
Pr
of
it 
- 20 %  + 15 % 
Deviation from TB 
3,5 %  
Estimated target budget 
10 M. NOK 
 
Actual accrued hour cost 
11 M. NOK   
(0,5 M. Non-weight 
variations) 
11 M. – 0,5 M = 10,5 M  
 
Deviation 
0,5 M NOK = 5 % 
overrun 
 
Profit % 
-5/2 + 3,5 =  1,0 % 
 
Profit NOK 
1,0 % x 10 M = 
100.000 NOK  
- 4 %  
13,5 % 
5 % 
overrun 
1,0 %
Target budget model calculated and adjusted figures for non-weight variations 
 Master’s thesis  Fredrik Horne 
Industrial Economics   Spring 2009 
84 : 104
6.1.6 Establishing cap 
A contract is often awarded in a competition with a tender process. There is no universal way 
of setting the cap in the tender process. The cap is often set in a negotiation process, 
sometimes the owner/contract awarder have given guidelines to the cap. The guidelines can 
be initiated maximum and minimum levels, and for the supplier to state his opinion.  
AOP have strategies that are used in tender process, and elements to consider in the phase of 
establishing cap are part of this. The outcome of a negotiation process is often a reflection of 
division of power. The supplier can lower his demands if his market situation is not locking 
so good, or higher his demand if his other alternatives to the contract is better. In this way 
AOP have different cap in their contract portfolio.  
Basic elements for AOP to consider in establishing of the cap: 
 How much of the work is to be done under the TB model? 
 How much flexibility is to be shown? 
 What is the profit in a reimbursable remuneration scheme? 
 The target budget model does not include bonuses. 
 Norms is just estimated, and have risk. 
This elements and assumptions is what make AOP’s strategy for establishing the cap in a 
target budget model. The cap in case of overrun is a contributor to risk in the project for the 
supplier. If the cap is established with a small down side at negative level, the price of the risk 
is lower then with a large negative cap. 
 
6.1.7 The use of cap in the target budget model 
The cap in a target budget can be looked to as a compromise agreement between the owner 
and the supplier as a part of the give and take in the 50/50 distribution off profit/loss, and to 
make this an agreeable model for both parts in the contract. 
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When the cap is reach the normal incentives in the target budget model stop, but work is 
carried out. This lack of incentives can make the supplier act for his best interest, and not 
necessarily the way that is optimal for the project. But from the owner side, the cap is 
necessary to not pay a high profit on the actual work. The incentives on establishing a good 
estimate is also stronger with a cap in the TB model. 
 
6.1.7.1 The downside in case of overrun 
For the supplier the best is to have a small downside, to reduce the risk of losing money. But 
in the mean time the estimate that is established is established by the supplier, and how he 
manage to be within the estimate is how he is getting paid. The cap in case of overrun is 
favourable for the supplier, and makes his risk premium lower. The premium varies with the 
conditions and size of the cap. If the overrun exceeds the cap, the incentives in the target 
budget model are repealed.  
 
6.1.7.2 The upside in case of underrun 
The cap on the upside is established to not pay an unreasonable high profit on the actual work. 
Since the profit is determine by the difference from final target budget, there is a need for 
establishing a cap. If there were no cap the supplier could end up making more profit then the 
actual costs. Worst case scenario for the owner is paying an extremely high profit, above 100 
%.  
The following is an extreme example of a project with underrun over the extreme cap. 
If the agreed cap is in maximum positive level 31,5 % at 50 % underrun (profit 6,5 % if zero 
over/underrun) 
Final target budget  100 000 000 NOK
Actual cost (excl profit)    30 000 000 NOK
Difference FTB – actual cost    70 %
 
The total profit 31,5% of FTB 31 500 000 NOK
 
Actual invoiced included profit 61 500 000 NOK 
 
Profit percent of actual cost/ work   31 500 000/ 30 000 000 = 1,05 = 105 % 
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One way of seeing it can be: The supplier have saved the owner for 70 million NOK, but only 
got 31,5 M.NOK. But the “savings” can be an error in the estimated rates and norms, or the 
supplier miscalculated on purpose.   
A high cap can give the supplier incentives to estimate wrong numbers, to get an abnormal 
high profit. The model needs to have a cap since the numbers are set in different stages of the 
target budget model. (Section 6.1) 
The most logical would be to have better profit when he fully out does what he has estimated 
to do, then when his work varies from the plan. This is a weakness in the target budget model. 
The incentives are set for the supplier to work better and faster, but this is not always so easy 
to plan. 
 
6.1.8 The Target budget and basic fundaments in the concept 
The concept about the target budget where the supplier have incentives to save money for the 
owner, and get rewarded, when executing the project is what make the model popular in use. 
Question can be asked in the practical use of the remuneration scheme, when the supplier is 
rewarded more when he miss on doing the work according to the estimate, then if he does 
exactly what he estimated and planed to do.  
The contractual rates are often based on experience and adjusted to the contracted scope of 
work. In the target budget model this contractual rates shall be without profit. The rates are 
often structured as a weighted average based on experience. Sometimes the rates are all-
including with administration, equipments, offices etc. In this way it is difficult to determine 
if the rates include profit or not. This can easily lead to a discussion, but the supplier is paid 
according to the final target budget and the contractual rates her, so what the estimate don’t 
matter more then its contribution to the cash flow under the execution of the project. 
The owner often has to raise money for the project. In the Norwegian oil and gas industry the 
installations are run by one operator, example StatoilHydro, but there are several other 
companies that hold the right for the field. The operator needs to raise money and can use the 
estimate to present the financial needs. As earlier mentioned the oil companies invest based 
on the cash flow, and the process of raising money is demanding. If the estimate is too high, 
the supplier and the operator, owner, can lose credibility among the other oil companies. 
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6.1.9 Anecdote, the use of target budget model in Google’s advertising campaigns  
The target budget model is also used by Google in there commercial advertising business. The 
supplier (Google) gets paid by there clients (the advertising company) in accordance with the 
target budget model. 
The estimated target budget is set as a price and marketing strategy from Google. Higher 
expected clicks give a higher price and more attention on Google’s internet site. The 50/50 
distribution of under or overrun, is linked to the click rate on the commercial.  
The cap is a maximum bonus for Google in case of extra clicks (underrun) or a discount for 
the client if fewer clicks (overrun). The final target budget is the actual number of clicks. 
Google then have incentives to achieve a higher click rate for the advertising company’s 
commercial, and if they achieve this they are paid more.  
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6.2 Discussion Spot price 
6.2.1 The use of spot price remuneration scheme 
The intention with the use of spot-price is to implement a contractual price that reflects the 
correct market price at every time. 
 
Spot-price is a common expression for most people, perhaps most known from the electric 
power industry, were the storage and consumption reflects the price on electricity. Just like 
this is also the price on raw materials for the industry. The price of materials fluctuates as a 
function of the supply of materials from the producers and the demand in the marked.  
 
The oil supplier industry have there costs related to raw materials and factor inputs, often 
machinery, equipment, raw materials and labour. The cost of labour is an important factor in 
the total cost picture, but I have chosen not to discuss this further in this thesis. 
 
The oil companies have there incomes from sale of produced hydrocarbons and sold services 
to other in the business. The price of oil fluctuates as a function of the supplier storages and 
the demand in the marked, both real time and expected. The expenses for the oil companies 
are to the government, other oil companies and suppliers in the industry.  
 
The supplier industry get there share of the high oil price in terms of more assignments and 
higher volume in the business. This does not directly mean a greater profit since more new 
people need to be hired and trained up, and can lead to lower productivity. New investments 
in machinery and equipment take time and money to incorporate. On the other side the oil 
companies get very favourable conditions in terms of higher income of there sold products. 
 
The fact that the prices are pushed up as a function of a higher demand is well known theory. 
In this way the supplier can be better paid when new contracts are rewarded. The supplier can 
have a portfolio of sub-suppliers who are demanding higher prices for there goods or services. 
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This general cost picture make the supplier come in a squeeze and price there risk after these 
situations. The use of spot-price remuneration scheme can lower the risk premium and with 
that the overall cost. Of course it can reflect badly in terms of a price raise in raw materials, 
but the risk is here shared between the two parties in the contract, and weighting of the risk 
depends on the parties’ ability to bear the risk. The remuneration scheme with spot price is 
launched to distribute the burden with the change in price of input factors. It gives a joint 
approach for some of the factors that are beyond both parties control. It make a more right 
approach in the way the costs in the project evolve, and witch of the two parties that have pay 
for this. 
 
If the cost of input factors goes down, the supplier will pay less for his materials, he will get 
less paid, and the final cost for the owner will go down. Same if the cost of input factors goes 
up, the supplier have to pay more for materials, but get paid more from the owner. To explain 
more about this I have chosen to describe more about the process that leads to the change in 
price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Historical steel price on plates, beams, CRC, HRC and avarage 
Source: Steel Business Briefing. Northern European prices. 
The historical steel price on plates, Beams, CRC (Cold Reduced Coil), HRC (Hot Rolled 
Coil), and average 
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6.2.2 The change in price, theoretical approach  
According to Van Weele, basically the price paid for materials and services is the result of 
environmental factors, both internal and external. Internal factors can be logistic, technical 
treatment or of organizational character. External factors are those factors that change the 
availability of a product in a given market and can be divided in to economical, socio-
political, or technological development.  
 
Changes in price can be described as the following: If the change in cost factors is identified 
by the symbol f (c), and the change in market factors by the symbol f (m), with f as a 
weighting factor, then the formula is: 
 
∑ (f (c) + f (m)) = 100 % of the price 
 
According to this formula, a change in the price paid is to be considered as the sum of the 
changes in the cost factors and/or changes in the market factors. Changes in cost factors can 
stem from: 
 f (c1): change in labour costs 
 f (c2): change in materials costs 
 f (c3): change in energy costs 
 f (c4): labour productivity 
 f (cn): etc. 
 
Changes in the market structure can stem from: 
 f (m1): change in demand 
 f (m2): change in supply 
 f (m3): change in supply side inventory 
 f (m4): change in supply side capacity utilization 
 f (mn): etc. 
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6.2.3 Spot price on raw materials as a remuneration scheme 
The supplier share the price volatile and thereby a part of his risk in the project with the 
owner. This method shall in the long run make the overall price of the work go down since 
the supplier has a lower risk premium. Still in a single agreement contract the owner has less 
incentives then the supplier to engage in a spot-price regulated contract then in a fixed-price 
contract. 
 
This compensation scheme is especially relevant in uncertain times, both in upwards and 
downwards economic trend. The latest “boom” in the industry leads to an enormous 
increment in the price of raw materials. This hade a bad economical influence for the 
suppliers who hade engaged in large fixed-price projects and the red numbers was big. The 
consequence of this is higher prices for the owner in future project, to cover the losses. The 
ongoing financial crisis has lead to fewer initiated projects, and prices in general are 
decreasing.  
 
In contracts and project that have a long time perspective, an escalation clause like spot price 
remuneration can be a good thing. This is to make the profit for the supplier more predictable, 
and make him focus on doing the work at an excellent quality in an efficient way. 
 
Figure 6.4: Interactive map of the Norwegian Oil & Gas “World-Class” Cluster  
(Source: Facts 2008)
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For the owner the price of raw materials often has a correlation with the price of sold goods, 
in this case the oil. The direct outcome of this is the increased income as a function of higher 
price of produced goods, but also increased expenditures on factor inputs, like raw materials 
 
On the Norwegian continental shelf there are many suppliers that do work for oil companies. 
Figure 6.4 gives an expression in what types of services that are provided. In this business it is 
primarily within subsea, platforms and operations (M&M) that the spot price remuneration 
will be highly relevant.  
 
6.2.3.1 Practical approach in spot price on raw materials as remuneration scheme 
For the remuneration scheme to be successful the two parties have to agree about some 
important parts that will be critical for the remuneration scheme to be successful. One of the 
success criteria is the regulation, it has to be linked to a credible index or market publication. 
There are many indexes and markets, both national and international. The two parties have to 
have an understanding of the structure in the index, and what components that is the 
foundation for the index. Statistics Norway publishes a wide number of indexes and raw 
material prices, and are consider as a reliable source. The figures behind these publications 
are often historical figures within the last month or weeks price developments and the prices 
paid on the market will be on the front edge of these prices. 
 
The index or market publication that is used in the regulation has to be highly relevant to the 
costs of the project. If the project involves many disciplines and materials, the remuneration 
scheme get more complex, but still straight forward, with a percentage distribution.  
 
The settlement has to be done often, as the indexes and raw materials vary at a day to day 
basis. The main idea about the remuneration scheme is to reflect the actual costs in the project 
so it has to be regulated often, at least every month, which is common practise for monthly 
settlement. 
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6.2.3.2 Example of use 
Spot-price metals 
NOK/Ton   
Aluminium Copper Nickel Zinc Lead 
2009      
April 8 554,7 29 015,3 73 338,1 9 065,9 9 070,9 
March 7 844,3 25 099,3 65 600,6 8 118,5 8 399,9 
February 7 486,2 22 665,7 71 443,8 7 652,0 7 560,1 
January 7 686,9 22 918,3 79 853,6 8 380,9 7 988,4 
       
2008      
December 7 836,3 21 395,9 68 081,9 7 696,5 6 708,0 
November 9 420,1 25 894,4 74 362,2 8 092,7 8 905,0 
October 11 250,6 33 236,0 82 664,2 8 763,1 9 939,0 
   
 
 
If used on an actual paid sum by the owner is a function of an agreed percentage fixed, and an 
agreed percentage related to the price of input factors.   
 
Ps = Pa * (0,5 + 0,5 * SPi / SP0) 
 
Ps = The total contractual remuneration, Paid sum  
 Pa = The agreed sum/ rate for remuneration 
SPi = spot-price materials in period i (aluminium) 
SP0 = spot-price materials in period 0 (aluminium) 
 
With an example of 10 millions in the month from January to February: 
  
Ps = 10 million * (0,5 + 0,5 * 7486,2/ 7686,9) 
 
Ps = 9,869 millions  
 
Source: London Metal Exchange (LME) and Statistics Norway (SSB)
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6.2.4 Spot price on oil as a remuneration scheme 
The oil companies get paid by selling there products, the oil. The oil price varies and makes 
the income of the business uncertain. If the supplier is paid as a function of the oil-price, he 
will bear some of the risks of the price being low for a long period, but will also share the 
upside of an increasing oil-price. The owner will not get the high peak income of the prices 
rise to a high level, but are also partly secured in a low price scenario. 
 
The oil companies have a fear of low oil prices in a long period, and will postpone new 
development projects. This remuneration scheme can have a benefit for the supplier industry 
as they bear some of the risk, and the owner will initiate projects that might not be profitable 
in a long time low-price scenario. This remuneration scheme will also work as a bonus for the 
supply companies in a high oil price scenario.  
 
6.2.4.1 Brief about the Norwegian surtax system for oil business 
The surtax from government in Norway applies for companies that produce oil and gas, and 
they are committed by law to pay these taxes. The remuneration scheme was presented for the 
Norwegian oil taxation office in May 2009, to have a taxation expert view. I will explain a 
little about my interpretation of these laws in relation to this remuneration scheme. 
 
According to the Norwegian law about taxation of underwater petroleum deposits (lov 1975-
06-13 nr 35: Lov om skattlegging av undersjøiske petroleumsforekomster) a company that 
operate in petroleum extraction, processing and pipeline transportation is to pay a surtax to 
the Government. According to the law and NOU 2000:18, this companies is interpret to also 
include services that are remunerated with a combination of price and volume is to be 
considered as part of production, and thereby taxable to the surtax. This lead to some disputes 
and the phrase was repealed in December 2004. Still companies that closely involve with each 
other can be judged by the government to be participants in another company, and thereby 
take part in there tax system. Thereby this remuneration scheme has to be carefully made and 
included in contract to not be a part of the surtax system. My interpretation and the response 
from Norwegian oil taxation office about this remuneration scheme is that it is just a 
regulation of the contractual sum and will thereby not a part of the surtax system, but it is 
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important to take in consider the existing laws in the applicable country, before enter in to this 
remuneration scheme. 
 
6.2.4.2 Practical approach in spot price on oil as remuneration scheme 
The oil companies have there revenue from sales of oil at the open market. Prices they will 
get for there product varies with the market. This remuneration scheme is launched for the 
supplier and owner to have a joint platform for income. Many oil companies invest on basis 
of the cash flow, and thereby have less to invest when the income decreases.  
 
The supplier are often meet with or squeezed in to renegotiations with following cut in rates 
and payment when the price of oil going down bellow the oil companies expected price level, 
but are not reward when the price goes up.  
 
If the supplier of an oil field construction or services is compensated in accordance with the 
actual market price on oil, will the market establish more realistic price expectations and more 
profitable projects will be executed. Spot price related remuneration will in practical use be 
insurance for both parties. The expenditure will be the supplier’s reward when higher price, 
but can also be less in case of low price. If the supplier is rewarded lower minimum rates 
together with spot price contract, an extended tale phase production can be the result. 
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Figure 6.5: Historical oil price graph, US dollar per barrel  
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6.2.4.3 Example in use 
Week 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 20,7 30,6 31,2 41,3 61,9 55,4 96,7 34,3 
5 19,9 30,9 30,1 44 63,9 56,6 92,4 43,8 
10 23,4 33,8 33,4 53 58,4 60,3  102,9 44,2 
15 24,3 24,9 34 50 69,1 68,3  106,7 51,4 
20 24,5 26,7 38,7 47,1 67,4 67,9  122,1 56,5 
25 25,1 26,8 34,9 56,6 68,4 72,3  122,1 
30 25,8 28,2 40,3 58,5 72,2 77,4  126,3 
35 27,1 28,5 40,2 66,5 67,2 71,5  112,8 
40 28,4 29,4 47 58,9 55,9 79,1 92,3 
45 23,5 28,9 43,3 58,2 56,8 93,9 59,8 
50 29,5 30,3 38,9 58,5 59,8 90,6 41,4 
52 30,4 29,5 38,6 57,1 64,3 93,7 36,3 
Yearly avrage 25,1 28,7 38,1 53,5 64,5 72,2 74,1 - 
 
Source: Statistic Norway (SSB) and Energy Information Administration USA (EIA) 
 
Ps = Pa * (0,3 + 0,7 * SPi / SP0) 
 
Ps = The total contractual remuneration, Paid sum  
 Pa = The agreed sum/ rate for remuneration 
SPi = spot-price oil in period i (week) 
SP0 = spot-price materials in period 0 (week) 
 
With an example of 10 millions in week 52 2008 to week 15 2009: 
  
Ps = 10 million * (0,3 + 0,7 * 51,4 / 36,3) 
 
Ps = 12,912 millions  
 
An alternative can be the use of the oil companies estimated oil price, extraction assumptions, 
as period 0.  
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6.2.5 Spot price on raw- materials and oil as a remuneration scheme 
This remuneration scheme makes both parties eat a peace of each others cake. This can be 
beneficial in order to smooth out the peaks and valleys in the long time picture, and is 
especially relevant in uncertain times.  
 
6.2.5.1 Example in use 
The following example of calculation according to remuneration based on spot price on oil 
and raw materials use figures from examples in section 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.4.3 (full table in 
appendix) 
 
Ps = Pa * (0,2 + 0,4 * SPMi / SPM0 + 0,4 * SPOi / SPO0) 
 
Ps = The total contractual remuneration, Paid sum  
 Pa = The agreed sum/ rate for remuneration 
SPMi = spot-price materials period i  
SPM0 = spot-price materials period 0  
SPOi = spot-price oil in period i (week) 
SPO0 = spot-price materials in period 0 (week) 
 
With example from December 2008 to March 2009, with aluminium as the used material  
 
Oil price is calculated for periods in weeks, with average price in the month to be: 
 
December 2008  = (45,15 + 41,17 + 42,68 + 36,34) / 4 =  41,33 
March 2009   = (44,16 + 44,04 + 45,80 + 51,19) / 4 =  46,30 
 
PS = 10 mill * (0,2 + 0,4 * 7 844,3/ 7 836,3 + 0,4 * 46,30/ 41,33 ) 
 
PS = 10,485 mill 
 
This is just a simply example, and the materials used in the project have to be reflected in the 
remuneration scheme. Several materials can be used to customise the remuneration to the 
relevant input factors in the project.
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6.2.6 Spot price as an alternative remuneration scheme in AOP’s contracts. 
AOP have frame agreements with sub-suppliers that insure the delivery of goods and services 
to competitive prices in the market. An example of this is the frame agreement within 
deliveries of steel products. The frame agreement is between Aker Solutions ASA and Norsk 
stål AS (A leading steel- and metal distributor in Norway). The agreement give Aker related 
companies a god discount on the listed prices according to the price list. The discount varies 
with the different products, and has roughly a discount of thirty percent. 
 
Frame agreements like this helps Aker Solutions get hold of the needed products at the right 
time to a comprehensive price. The discounts are just in percentages to the listed prices, so the 
listed prices vary, and a new product price is listed every month. 
 
The prices published by Statistic Norway (SSB) indicate the price development on raw 
materials, and are published monthly. Even if this publication is not the exact amount AOP 
pays for there input factors, the price indicates the market situation, and the material 
expenditures in the project.  
 
For a client the link between actual expenditures in the project to the invoiced prices is often 
agreed in the contract. In some of AOP’s contracts they are paid fully out for there 
expenditures, like in reimbursable contracts, and the clients can also pay the direct cost (with 
a fee) on the procurement. In these contracts the spot price remuneration scheme is not a god 
alternative. But in fixed price contracts like new building of complex offshore structures the 
remuneration scheme will come to proper use. 
 Master’s thesis  Fredrik Horne 
Industrial Economics   Spring 2009 
99 : 104
7. Conclusion  
7.1 Target budget 
The target budget model is the preferred remuneration scheme in Aker Solutions presented 
maintenance and modification projects, probably because it gives Aker Solutions as a supplier 
the incentives to reduce the cost of the project. The model also contributes to the two parties 
having the same objectives in the execution of the project. The supplier’s incentive in this 
remuneration scheme is to save money for the owner, and by this his profit increases.  
 
In the examined cases the target budget model is used, but varies in the degree of use. The 
lack of agreement in handling of variations and estimate have lead to little use in one of the 
projects, wile the other project execute most of the work according to the target budget model. 
When the contracted rates are not up to date with the cost picture in the industry to day, some 
of the intention with the incentives has naturally been weakened. A success criterion for the 
target budget model is a good consensus in the working collaboration between the parties. 
 
The profit and related cap are often sat in a negotiation process before the contract is 
rewarded. The outcome of this process reflects the market situation, and the distribution of 
power among the parties engaged in the contract. The principles with the target budget 
models 50/50 distribution of profit and loss automatically determine the slope of the graph, 
and thereby the profit/loss at the cap. But the size of the cap is determined in a negotiation 
process. When the cap is reached the incentive in the model goes away. The supplier can still 
have more profit on his actual cost in case of underrun, but newer more then the agreed profit 
gap according to the final target budget. A large cap in case of underrun can lead to an 
extreme high profit for the supplier on his actual costs. 
 
When handling projects with target budget as remuneration scheme it is important to be aware 
of how variations have influence on the target budget model. The figures needs to be adjusted 
as the model often are compensated on the as built quantities. 
 
Weaknesses in the model are that the supplier should have more to win on exact hitting the 
estimated target budget, walk his talk. 
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7.2 Spot price 
This remuneration scheme with spot prices gives the parties in a contract a joint approach for 
some of the factors that are beyond there control. It make a more right approach in the way 
the costs in the project evolve, and witch of the two parties that have pay for this. 
 
If the actual cost of input factors goes down, the supplier will pay less for his materials, and 
the final cost for the owner will go down. Same if the cost of input factors goes up, the 
supplier have to pay more for materials, but get paid more from the owner. In overall the price 
of the projects in total will go down, since the supplier charge a lower risk premium. 
 
The remuneration scheme as suggested is for regulating the paid cost in a project. For it to be 
successful it has to: 
 The regulating has to be linked to a credible index   
 The index has to be highly relevant to the costs of the project 
 
This model is at a certain degree quality assured for use in Norway and the Norwegian 
taxation system. There is large a variety in laws for taxation in the world, so it is important to 
look into the specific laws for the country and the business before adapting this remuneration 
scheme. 
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Appendix 
Weekly spot price oil  
Uke 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 20,7 30,6 31,2 41,3 61,9 55,4 96,7 34,3
2 18,6 31,4 32,2 44,7 62,5 50,9 95,0 44,5
3 19 32,1 32 45 63,2 51,8 90,7 42,4
4 19,6 31,1 30,5 46,1 62,9 55,5 88,4 44,0
5 19,9 30,9 30,1 44 63,9 56,6 92,4 43,8
6 21,1 32,3 29,9 42,9 60,8 58,4 90,5 43,6
7 19,7 32,8 31,1 42,9 57,5 55,6 95,8 45,2
8 20,2 33,4 31,9 46,9 58,3 57,7 97,7 42,3
9 21,9 33,8 33,9 51,2 60,9 60,4 99,8 42,0
10 23,4 33,8 33,4 53 58,4 60,3  102,9 44,2
11 24,4 28,6 34,5 54,6 62,1 61  108,4 44,0
12 25 26,2 34,3 55,2 61,2 61,6  103,8 45,8
13 26,5 27,3 32,9 52,1 64,9 66,6  102,5 51,2
14 25,1 25,1 32 53,7 67,2 69,9  100,8 48,6
15 24,3 24,9 34 50 69,1 68,3  106,7 51,4
16 26,4 25,3 33 50 72,3 65,9  110,0 51,7
17 26,6 23,2 33,9 50,8 73,4 67,6  113,8 49,2
18 26,1 23,9 36,1 49,2 73,5 64,7  111,4 49,8
19 26,5 26 37,6 48,1 70 63,8  119,3 53,9
20 24,5 26,7 38,7 47,1 67,4 67,9  122,1 56,5
21 24,3 26,4 38,3 47,9 67,9 71,7  110,0 57,6
22 23,3 27,9 38,3 49,7 67,9 55,3  113,8 60,6
23 22,9 28,6 35,2 51,4 67 72,4  111,4 66,6
24 24,6 26,8 34,7 53,2 65,1 70,5  118,4  
25 25,1 26,8 34,9 56,6 68,4 72,3  122,1  
26 25,7 28,4 32,8 56,3 72,3 72,7  135,4  
27 25,2 28,2 36,2 57,9 73,7 75,3  139,2  
28 26,3 28,9 36,8 57,5 73,8 78,8  137,1  
29 25,5 28,2 38,7 57,1 73,3 79,1  134,7  
30 25,8 28,2 40,3 58,5 72,2 77,4  126,3  
31 25,5 29,9 42,4 60,9 76,6 77,4  123,6  
32 26,4 29,8 43,4 64,2 77,5 71,7  117,6  
33 27,6 29 44 65,4 71,7 71  111,2  
34 27,2 30 42,6 65,9 71,3 68,9  112,2  
35 27,1 28,5 40,2 66,5 67,2 71,5  112,8  
36 28,5 27,5 40,4 63,6 64,6 75,9  104,8  
37 28,2 26,2 41,8 61,4 60,3 78,1 97,7  
38 29,3 26,1 44,6 63,2 59,5 79,2 90,4  
39 30 28 46,8 62 58,4 79,3  101,3  
40 28,4 29,4 47 58,9 55,9 79,1 92,3  
41 28,7 31,2 50,7 58,3 57,5 79,9 81,4  
42 26,8 29,5 48,9 59 58,3 85,3 69,7  
43 25,5 28,5 51,2 58,6 57,4 83,4 64,7  
44 24,6 27,8 45,5 59,5 55,4 90,3 61,4  
45 23,5 28,9 43,3 58,2 56,8 93,9 59,8  
46 24 29,8 40,7 53,4 57,9 91,6 53,7  
47 24,4 27,9 42,9 53 55,5 94 48,2  
48 25,9 28,3 41,3 53 56,6 92,7 49,2  
49 26,8 29,6 37,9 55,1 57,9 89,5 44,1  
50 29,5 30,3 38,9 58,5 59,8 90,6 41,4  
51 31,4 29,8 41,4 56,6 63,2 91 42,1  
52 30,4 29,5 38,6 57,1 64,3 93,7 36,3  
